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“In questions of power, then, let no more be said of confidence in man, 
but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.” 
—Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolution of 17981 
INTRODUCTION 
About a year and a half before the tenth anniversary of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States Supreme Court was 
primed to hear oral arguments in a case concerning seventeen detainees 
who had been held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base since 2002. The 
case, known in its various iterations as Kiyemba v. Obama,2 presented the 
Court with an opportunity to vindicate the purposes of the writ of habeas 
corpus by finally and firmly establishing the remedy attached to the right of 
habeas corpus, a right guaranteed to Guantanamo Bay detainees in the 
landmark 2008 case of Boumediene v. Bush.3 Instead, after the government 
had advised the Court of post-certiorari developments at the proverbial 
eleventh hour,4 the Court subsequently vacated the appeal from a District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals’ judgment, a decision which found that 
federal courts lacked the power to release detainees into the continental 
United States even when other release options were not available, and 
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of “[t]his change in the 
underlying facts.”5  The dismissal of the previously granted cert. petition 
amounted to a statement to this effect: Why should the Court get involved 
at this point?  Why indeed.  The question presented to the Court is a 
legal—not factual—one that goes to the heart of the separation of powers 
problem that the lower court created. The Court’s dismissal in a per curiam 
opinion without objection from any of the justices and over the strong 
objections of the detainees’ lawyers6 renders the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, 
reinstated on remand, the final word on the remedy to which habeas 
petitioners are entitled.  That no justice objected to the dismissal gives the 
appearance of a unified court, and adds strength to the reinstated opinion of 
 
 1.  Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolution of 1798 (1798), reprinted in Scott Horton, 
Jefferson – The Risk of too Much Confidence in Elected Officials, HARPER’S MAGAZINE (July 4, 2009), 
http://harpers.org/blog/2009/07/jefferson-the-risk-of-too-much-confidence-in-elected-government/.  
 2.  Kiyemba I, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009) (cert. granted).  
 3.  553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 4.  See Letter from Elena Kagan, then-U.S. Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the 
Supreme Court of the United Sates (Feb. 19, 2010) available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/SG-Kiyemba-letter-2-19-10.pdf (describing the relocation offers made) 
[hereinafter Feb. 19, 2010 Kagan Letter; see also Letter from Sabin Willett, Detainee Counsel in the 
Kiyemba v. Obama Litigation, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States 
(Feb. 19, 2010) at 4 available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10
_08_1234_PetitionersLetterBrief.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter]. 
 5.  Kiyemba I, 559 U.S. 131, (2010) (subsequent dismissal and remand). 
 6.  See Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter, supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that “[r]eview of that 
constitutionally intolerable decision remains as necessary today as when certiorari was granted”). 
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the lower court, despite its misguided reliance on a doctrine that allows the 
political branches’ policy choices to reign supreme.7 
This Article considers the ramifications of the Kiyemba litigation, 
focusing particularly on what the case means to our understanding of the 
rule of law more than ten years after September 11. This Article makes 
three primary arguments: First, although the Supreme Court provided 
Guantanamo Bay detainees access to U.S. courts through the writ of habeas 
corpus, it has failed to provide a meaningful remedy for habeas petitioners, 
despite ample constitutional and doctrinal authority for doing so. This 
rights-remedy gap is problematic from a rule of law standpoint, and the gap 
is well illustrated by the Kiyemba litigation.8 Second, the Court’s failure to 
consider the merits of the case, thus allowing a problematic lower court 
opinion to stand, has perpetuated confusion in a doctrinal area of 
constitutional, political, and rhetorical significance.  A dissent to the per 
curiam dismissal would, at the very least, have served the significant 
purpose of articulating core constitutional values.  Finally, the D.C. 
Circuit’s application of immigration law to the habeas remedy question in 
its reinstated opinion in Kiyemba v. Obama9 effectively trumps the 
detainees’ constitutional right to obtain release by substituting immigration 
law’s doctrinally exceptional deference to the Executive for what long has 
been understood as the core function of habeas corpus: undoing illegal 
detention by the Executive. 
The now-controlling D.C. Circuit opinion offers one viewpoint: 
habeas relief, when it involves release into the continental United States, is 
an immigration matter where, by virtue of the branch’s plenary power, the 
Executive’s decisions govern.  The courts, in the D.C. Circuit’s view, have 
 
 7.  See Joshua A. Geltzer, Decisions Detained: The Courts’ Embrace of Complexity in 
Guantanamo-Related Litigation, 29 BERK.J. INT’L L. 94, 111 (2011) (“Having granted certiorari, the 
Supreme Court was expected to have the final say, but ended up vacating the circuit court’s opinion, 
then seeing it reinstated by the D.C. Circuit.”); Laura J. Arandes, Note, Life Without Parole: An 
Immigration Framework Applies to Potentially Indefinite Detention at Guantanamo Bay, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1046, 1051 & n.32 (2011) (“While the facts undergirding the Uighurs’ original petition for release 
have changed, the Kiyemba decision remains good law.”). 
 8.  Caroline W. Stanton, Rights and Remedies: Meaningful Habeas Corpus in Guantanamo, 23 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 898 (2010) (“[H]istorically[,] habeas remedies were limited to 
unconditional release. . . . [T]he power to grant the writ has always meant the power to grant the release 
[of the unlawfully detained].”) see also Caprice L. Roberts, Rights, Remedies, and Habeas Corpus—
The Uighurs, Legally Free While Actually Imprisoned, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 5 (2009) (“The nature, 
scope, and enforcement of remedies shape substantive rights.  One of the law’s most fundamental 
maxims is that for every wrong, there must be a remedy.”) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23, 109).  But see Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (“Not every violation of a right yields a remedy, even when the right is constitutional.  
Application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to defeat a remedy is one common example.  
Another example, closer to this case, is application of the political question doctrine [to defeat a 
remedy].”). 
 9.  Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reinstating and modifying to take into account 
new developments in a per curiam opinion in Kiyemba III cited at 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(Rogers, J., concurring)).   
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no part to play because immigration issues fall squarely within the 
Executive’s sovereign prerogative.  This approach, I believe, sanctions 
whatever political remedy the Executive may select—here, diplomatically 
negotiated resettlement outside of the United States—as a substitute for the 
legal remedy of release.  The D.C. Circuit’s view cannot be correct, I 
argue, because it would mean that, although a court may find that a 
detainee’s imprisonment is unlawful,10 that court might be powerless to 
remedy the unlawful imprisonment.  Thus, I offer a view contrary to the 
D.C. Circuit: in order to accord complete habeas relief particularly where, 
as here, relocation efforts remain long-ongoing, a habeas court must have 
the authority to admit foreign nationals into the interior of the United States 
as a remedy for their unlawful detention.  Historically, “the writ of habeas 
corpus was conceived and used as a control against the unlawful use of 
executive power.”11 And traditionally, custody of the body transfers to the 
court in habeas proceedings so that the court may order “the immediate and 
non-discretionary release of an illegally detained person.”12  Such authority 
ensures that the courts of this country are able to act in a way that restores 
the rule of law, so deeply damaged in the months and years following 
September 11. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, I provide the factual and 
procedural history of the Kiyemba litigation.  In Part II, I consider 
Kiyemba’s context, looking to historical perspectives on the role of courts 
in wartime, the Supreme Court’s post-September 11 jurisprudence, and the 
development of “national security fundamentalism” in the D.C. Circuit 
after September 11.  In so doing, I discuss how, in the months and years 
following September 11, the Executive asserted inherent power that 
rendered it nearly unreviewable and that, through the acquiescence of some 
courts, significantly undermined the rule of law.  In Part III, I reconsider 
Kiyemba, highlighting the illegality of indefinite detention and the right to 
a corresponding remedy.  Contrary to the position taken by the D.C. 
Circuit, the rights-remedy gap is not an unreviewable facet of the 
Executive’s plenary power over immigration.  Instead, it is a practical and 
necessary reality to be handled by the federal courts.  The judiciary’s 
failure to assert its constitutional role in this area, I argue, may be the result 
 
 10.  The first court to review the Uighurs’ petition found their detention unlawful.  See In re 
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]his court rules that the 
government’s continued detention of the petitioners is unlawful.”).  The D.C. Circuit, while reversing 
the district court’s release order, did not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the Uighurs’ 
ongoing detention was unlawful.   
 11.  Brief for Petitioner at 45-46, Kiyemba I, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009)  available  at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10
_00_1234_PetitionerAmCuUKParliament.authcheckdam.pdf; [hereinafter Lord Goldsmith Brief]; see 
also In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 39.  
 12.  Lord Goldsmith Brief, supra note 11, at 46 (observing that “[i]t would be a surprising result 
that would run counter to this history if the exercise of executive powers—in this instance immigration 
powers—was allowed to thwart the operation of the writ”). 
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of judicial abstention caused by political and practical influences on the 
Court. 
I staunchly believe that the habeas right is accompanied by a release 
remedy.  Where there is no threat to the public safety, and where other 
release options are not available, that remedy must be release into the 
United States.  And above all, I believe that this case is not an immigration 
matter subject to the prerogatives of the political branches.13  However, 
accepting that the practical and political influences described above may 
continue to prevent courts from awarding such relief, there is nonetheless a 
need for recognition of the damage that the political remedy of indefinite 
detention inflicts on the rule of law.  Thus, in Part IV, I make a case for the 
value of an opinion dissenting from the Supreme Court’s per curiam 
dismissal in Kiyemba I—a reminder, however small, but unquestionably 
important, that the rule of law remains. 
I. KIYEMBA V. OBAMA: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The legal saga of the seventeen detainees involved in the Kiyemba 
litigation begins, and someday (one hopes) will end, with relocation into 
the interior of U.S. territory.  Sometime early in 2001, a number of 
Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority group from the Xinxiang province in 
China, which long has been subjected to oppression and torture, fled China 
for the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan, where they settled into 
camps.14  After September 11, 2001, American aerial strikes destroyed the 
Uighurs’ Tora Bora camp.15  Fleeing their destroyed camp, the unarmed 
Uighurs crossed into Pakistan,16 where they were taken in by local villagers 
and provided with food and shelter.17  In December 2001, the Uighurs were 
arrested by the Pakistani government and, for a sizeable bounty, transferred 
to U.S. custody.18  In June 2002, the Uighurs were transferred to the naval 
base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they remained imprisoned for more 
 
 13.  For example, Congress added a rider to a defense funding bill, the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859 to bar use of defense funding to release 
in the continental U.S. anyone detained at Guantanamo on the date of the bill’s enactment.  This rider 
was a political response to the Executive’s plan to resettle some of the Kiyemba I petitioners in 
Virginia.  See Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Plans to Accept Several Chinese Muslims From Guantanamo, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/24/nation/na-gitmo-release24.  As noted in 
the Kiyemba I petition for writ of certiorari, “[r]esponding to highly-charged political opposition to this 
plan, the President shelved it.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 10-775 Kiyemba v. Obama, (Dec. 8, 
2010), at 7 (footnote omitted) available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/12/2010-12-08-Kiyemba-III-petition.pdf.  
 14.  Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, 1023–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
 15.  Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1024; Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837.  
 16.  See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  See id.; In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2008).  
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than five years.19 
In 2004, the Department of Defense held Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals for the Uighurs.20  The tribunals determined that the Uighurs 
were enemy combatants based on a theory that the detained Uighurs had 
been involved with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which 
the State Department had designated a terrorist organization three years 
after they entered U.S. custody;21 that the ETIM was associated with Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban; and that the ETIM had engaged in hostilities 
against the United States, the Defense Department classified them as 
enemy combatants.22  In Parhat v. Gates,23 the D.C. District Court, 
considering the Uighurs’ challenge to their designation, ruled that the 
government presented insufficient evidence to warrant designating the 
Uighurs as enemy combatants.  Following the Parhat decision, the 
government formally retracted, and never again argued in support of, the 
Uighurs’ classification as enemy combatants.24 
A. The Case in the Lower Courts 
The Uighurs began filing petitions for habeas corpus in 2005, but due 
to various congressional enactments and Supreme Court cases, review of 
the Uighurs’ petitions did not begin until 2008.  In In re Guantanamo Bay 
Detainee Litigation, which later became known as Kiyemba I throughout 
the appellate and certiorari process, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia considered the Uighurs’ petitions for the first time, concluding 
that “the Constitution prohibits indefinite detention without just cause,” and 
that, as a result, the government’s continued detention of the non-enemy 
combatant Uighurs was unlawful.25  Having found the Uighurs’ detention 
unlawful, the trial court ordered the Uighurs’ release.26  However, the court 
struggled to find a relocation site for the Uighurs upon release.  The 
Uighurs objected to release in China, their native country, citing fear of 
arrest, torture, or execution.27  Subsequent efforts by the Executive to find 
an alternative relocation site for the Uighurs proved unsuccessful, as no 
other third-party countries were willing to accept the Uighurs, perhaps due 
to political pressure from the Chinese government or due to the Executive’s 
 
 19.  See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837.  
 20.  See id. at 838.  
 21.  Samuel Chow, Note, The Kiyemba Paradox: Creating a Judicial Framework to Eradicate 
Indefinite, Unlawful Executive Detentions, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 775, 793 n.126 (2011).  
 22.  Parhat, 532 F.3d at 838.  
 23.  Id. at 834. 
 24.  See Chow, supra note 21, at 793 (citing Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2009). It 
has been reported that the government knew as early as 2003 that the Uighurs’ detainment was in error.  
See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, OUR PAGES, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-
cases/Kiyemba-v.-bush.  
 25.  In re Guantanamo Bay Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34, 38–39 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 26.  Id. at 34. 
 27.  See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1024.   
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original determination that the Uighurs were worthy of the enemy 
combatant designation.28  In their petitions for habeas corpus, the Uighurs 
sought release into the continental United States, as no other options were 
available to them at that time.29 
Considering the release issue, the D.C. District Court acknowledged 
that the authority to admit aliens has typically been a political inquiry, but 
noted that these powers are not absolute.30  However, in the court’s view, 
the Uighurs’ case presented “exceptional” circumstances: The government 
captured the Uighurs and “transported them to a detention facility where 
they will remain indefinitely.”31  The government had not charged them 
with a crime, and it “presented no reliable evidence that they would pose a 
threat to U.S. interests.”32  Moreover, the district court explained, the 
government “stymied its own efforts to resettle” the Uighurs “by 
insisting . . . that they were enemy combatants, the same designation given 
to terrorists willing to detonate themselves amongst crowds of civilians.”33  
Because habeas corpus is an “indispensable mechanism for monitoring the 
separation of powers,” the court found that the government’s so-called 
“best efforts” to attempt to resettle the Uighurs did not substantively 
change the nature of their claims.34  Instead, according to the district court, 
the government’s unsuccessful efforts to relocate the Uighurs over a period 
of five years suggested that the Uighurs’ detention had “crossed the 
constitutional threshold into infinitum.”35  Stating that “our system of 
checks and balances is designed to preserve the fundamental right of 
liberty,” the court granted the Uighurs’ request for release into the United 
States.36  The government immediately appealed the district court’s ruling. 
Considering the case on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia began by analyzing “several firmly established 
propositions.”37  The court first noted the “ancient principle” that a state 
has the absolute right to exclude or admit aliens and “to prescribe 
applicable terms and conditions for their exclusion or admission.”38  Since 
the Chinese Exclusion Case,39 the court explained, the Supreme Court had, 
“without exception, sustained the exclusive power of the political branches 
to decide” whether an alien may enter the United States and what the terms 
 
 28.  See id.; see Chow, supra note 21, at 794–95.  
 29.  Chow, supra note 21, at 794.  
 30.  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig. 581 F. Supp. 2d at 40.  
 31.  Id.   
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 42–43.  
 35.  Id. at 43.   
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
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for their entry may be based on the so-called plenary power doctrine.40  
Accordingly, no court has the authority, unless explicitly provided by law, 
to review a political branch determination of exclusion.41  Because the 
Executive determined that the Uighurs should not be permitted entry into 
the United States, the Court of Appeals found no authority for the district 
court to set aside that determination.42  Furthermore, the court stated its 
uncertainty about whether the Uighurs “would [even] qualify for entry or 
admission under the immigration laws.”43  As a result, it was not convinced 
that their entry into the United States was compelled by law.44  The mere 
fact that the Uighurs were found not to be enemy combatants did not, the 
court stated, qualify them for admission into the United States.45  In light of 
these considerations, and based on the fact that no law expressly authorized 
the court to release the Uighurs into the United States, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court’s release order and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with their opinion.46 
B. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari Review 
In October 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Kiyemba I to decide whether a federal court, employing its habeas 
jurisdiction under Boumediene v. Bush, has the power to order the release 
of individuals detained by the executive for seven years, “where the 
detention is indefinite and without authorization in law, and release into the 
continental United States is the only possible remedy.”47  Between 
February 3 and February 5, 2010, the parties submitted letters informing 
the Court that the Swiss government had agreed to accept two of the 
Uighur petitioners.48  The other five petitioners were previously offered 
resettlement by two countries—Palau and “another nation” according to the 
government—although the detainees rejected those offers for a variety of 
reasons.49  According to then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan, these 
developments eliminated the core factual premise of the case—namely, that 
 
 40.  Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1025. 
 41.  Id. at 1026 (citing United States v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).  
 42.  See id.  
 43.  Id. at 1029. 
 44.  See id.  For a discussion of the Court of Appeals’ views on whether immigration law might 
provide a valid basis for detention, including the application of refugee, asylum, and parole law, see id. 
at 1029−31. 
 45.  See id. at 1029.  
 46.  Id. at 1032. 
 47.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458, 559 (2009); Petition for Certiorari, No. 08-1234, 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458 (Apr. 3, 2009). 
 48.  See Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Orders New Briefing in Uighur Case, BLOG OF LEGAL 
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/02/supreme-court-orders-
new-briefing-in-uighur-case.html. 
 49.  Id.; see also  Feb. 19, 2010 Kagan Letter, supra note 4 (describing the relocation offers 
made).  
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release into the United States was the only available remedy.50  In light of 
these developments, Kagan argued, the Uighurs’ continuing presence at 
Guantanamo was completely “voluntary.”51  On February 12, 2010, the 
Supreme Court requested that the parties file letter briefs with the Court 
addressing “the effect, if any, of the developments discussed in the letters 
submitted by the parties on February 3 and February 5.”52 
On March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court rendered its per curiam opinion 
in Kiyemba I.53  According to the Court, the change in the underlying facts 
raised by the February letters “may affect the legal issues presented” to the 
Court.54  No lower court had yet ruled “in light of the new facts,” and the 
Supreme Court refused to be the first court to rule on these new factual 
issues.55  Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case with instructions that the lower court 
determine “in the first instance, what further proceedings in that court or in 
the District Court are necessary and appropriate for the full and prompt 
disposition of the case in light of the new developments.”56  Without saying 
so explicitly, the Court’s per curiam opinion amounted to a determination 
that the new facts rendered the case moot. 
On remand, in what came to be called Kiyemba III,57 the D.C. Court of 
Appeals reinstated its judgment and opinion in Kiyemba I, modified to 
account for the recent developments in relocating the Uighurs.58  Shortly 
thereafter, the Supreme Court denied the Uighurs’ renewed petition for 
certiorari.59  Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor issued a 
brief statement addressing the denial.  In their view, the government’s 
resettlement offers, “the lack of any meaningful challenge [by the Uighurs] 
as to their appropriateness, and the Government’s uncontested commitment 
to continue to work to resettle [the Uighurs] transform [the habeas] 
claim.”60  Put differently, there is, the justices stated, “no Government-
imposed obstacle to petitioners’ timely release and appropriate 
resettlement.”61  If circumstances were to materially change, the justices 
 
 50.  See Feb. 19, 2010 Kagan Letter, supra note 4. 
 51.  Linda Greenhouse, Saved by the Swiss, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/saved-by-the-swiss/ (describing Kagan’s arguments). 
 52.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (No. 08-1234) (2010).  
 53.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131, (2010) (subsequent dismissal and remand). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)).  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  As for Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010), it 
relates only tangentially to Kiyemba I and III.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, Normalizing Guantanamo, 48 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1547, 1558-62 (2011) (explaining that Kiyemba II involves similar issues raised 
when the military detention of terrorism suspects is concerned). 
 58.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010).   
 59.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).  
 60.  Id. at 1631.  
 61.  Id. 
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stated that the Uighurs should “raise their original issue (or related issues) 
again in the lower courts and this Court.”62 
Thus, for now, and for at least some of the Uighur detainees, their 
story did indeed finally end, as it began, in relocation—albeit in relocation 
to a foreign country.  For others, relocation remains little more than a hope.  
Regardless, at the time that the Supreme Court was presented with the 
petitions in Kiyemba I and Kiyemba III, the Uighurs were still being—and 
had been, for over six years—unlawfully detained by the U.S. government.  
New factual issues related to continuing diplomatic negotiations for 
transfer to another country should not have altered the legal requirement to 
release them, at the very least pending successful completion of the 
negotiations for their release.  While the majority of the Uighurs originally 
brought to Guantanamo Bay in 2002 have since been relocated, several 
remain, effectively indefinitely detained, by virtue of their simple desire to 
select, or at least have a say in, the place where they will live—a right that 
rule of law principles suggests they are entitled, having had their detention 
determined unlawful. 
Petitioners’ reasons for rejecting available relocation offers are varied, 
but not without cause.  For example, Bahtiyar Mahnut refused to accept 
Palau’s offer of relocation because that country refused to accept his 
brother, Arkin Mahmud, who had developed severe mental health problems 
at Guantanamo after spending considerable time in solitary confinement, 
due to its purported inability to treat those problems within its borders.63  
And as noted in petitioners’ letter brief to the Court, “[t]he consequences of 
solitary confinement are psychologically brutal,” and therefore likely to 
require significant treatment options.64  Other detainees rejected relocation 
offers because the proposed locations were not home to an established 
Uighur community.65  The group of Uighurs relocated to Albania shortly 
before the Supreme Court oral argument in the Kiyemba case, illustrate the 
problems that may arise from relocation to foreign lands.  The Uighurs now 
living in Albania live in a refugee camp, monitored by armed guards, and 
surrounded by razor wire.66  There is no established Uighur community in 
Albania, and the Uighurs do not speak the language, making social 
integration difficult, if not impossible.67  Moreover, relocated Uighurs have 
 
 62.  Id. at 1632. 
 63.  See Del Quentin Wilber, Uighur’s Chance to Leave Guantanamo Means Leaving Brother, 
WASH. POST, (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/27/AR2009092703076.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2009092703279.  
 64.  Feb. 19, 2010 Willet Letter, supra note 4, at 2 (citing to the Court’s observation of this 
condition in In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890)). 
 65.  See Chinese Muslims at Guantanamo Bay Still Need Help Resettling, FT. WAYNE J. 
GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2010, at 11A.  
 66.  Kara Simard, Note, Innocent at Guantanamo Bay: Granting Political Asylum to Unlawfully 
Detained Uighur Muslims, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 365, 386 (2007).  
 67.  See id.  
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often reported social and community alienation due to their political status, 
and the assumption that either their original designation as “enemy 
combatants” or their time spent at Guantanamo means that they are violent 
or dangerous. 
Apparently in the eyes of the Court, however, the Uighurs are “too 
picky” in their relocation wishes, refusing perfectly good resettlement 
offers.68  This undoubtedly is a problematic position. The government 
wasn’t “very discriminating when [it] scooped them up in Afghanistan, and 
carried them away,” ultimately detaining the Uighurs for nearly a decade.69  
As one commentator has noted, “[i]s the idea that as long as they aren’t 
being tortured they should be pleased to find themselves wherever we 
might put them next?  How about a research station in Antarctica?”70  I 
believe that habeas relief must be accompanied by a meaningful remedy, in 
this case, physical freedom, without the restrictions associated with life, 
albeit in the “least restrictive conditions” available, at the Guantanamo Bay 
naval base.  It also must be accompanied by other rights that the detainees 
long have been denied, including the right to have some say in the ultimate 
location where they will live.  The Uighurs’ detention has been found to be 
unlawful; their designation as “enemy combatants” was declared 
unjustified.  They must be relocated from the site of their detention.  Surely 
we cannot blame them for wanting some choice in where they end up.  At 
the very least, pending permanent relocation to an “appropriate country,” 
mutually selected, the Uighurs could be resettled in an established Uighur 
community in the United States.71 
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kiyemba III, the D.C. 
Circuit’s Kiyemba I decision, reinstated as modified, still stands.  As 
commentators have noted, the Supreme Court’s last act—or rather, its 
failure to act—allows its landmark 2008 decision in Boumediene to unravel 
to the point of its near-evisceration.72  Without a meaningful remedy, 
habeas relief means little.73  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit’s governing 
opinion does not account for the potentially unending nature of the War on 
Terror,74 and incorrectly relies on immigration law as a basis for denying 
 
 68.  See Amy Davidson, The Uighurs’ Passover Story, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 19, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2011/04/uighurs-supreme-court-guantanamo-
passover.html).  
 69.  See id.  
 70.  Id.   
 71.  See Amended Brief for Uyghur American Association as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 16, Kiyemba v. Bush, (No. 08-5424) (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2008), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Uyghur%20American%20Association%20-%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf. 
 72.  See, e.g., Chow, supra note 21, at 777; Jennifer L. Milko, Comment, Separation of Powers 
and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases 
and the Need for Supreme Guidance, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 195 (2012).   
 73.  See infra Part II.A. 
 74.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
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release to the Uighur detainees.75  In Hamdi, the Supreme Court stated that 
it had “no reason to doubt that [lower] courts faced with . . . sensitive 
matters,” like those raised in Kiyemba and the other detainee cases, “will 
pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise in 
an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding 
essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”76  
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Kiyemba I, reinstated in Kiyemba III, 
suggests that the Court’s faith was misguided.  Rather than balancing the 
competing interests of national security and individual rights, the court 
incorrectly employing immigration law’s plenary power doctrine deferred 
entirely to the decision-making of the executive branch.  It is now time—
however unlikely—for the Supreme Court to “finish what it started”77 more 
than four years ago in Boumediene, and definitively rule on the proper 
remedy to be fashioned by habeas courts in cases related to Guantanamo 
Bay. 
II. PLACING KIYEMBA IN CONTEXT: DETERIORATION OF THE RULE 
OF LAW POST-9/11 
On September 11, 2001, a group of individuals associated with the Al-
Qaeda terrorist organization executed a coordinated strike against the 
United States, resulting in the deaths of 3,000 innocent civilians, the 
“largest single day death toll from foreign attack on American soil.”78  
Within days of the attacks, the legislative and executive branches began 
responding with measures designed to prevent future terrorist attacks 
against the United States.79  As challenges were made to these measures, 
the federal courts became involved in an “ongoing dialogue” with the 
political branches of government80—a dialogue that has played out over the 
course of the last ten years.  At the very heart of this dialogue are questions 
about the proper role of the federal courts in wartime. 
These questions are not new.  Indeed, in a variety of cases, stretching 
from the Civil War to the so-called “War on Terror,”81 courts have 
 
 75.  See infra Part I.B.  
 76.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (plurality opinion).  
 77.  Milko, supra note 72, at 197.   
 78.  Saxby Chambliss, The Future of Detainees in the Global War on Terror: A U.S. Policy 
Perspective, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 821, 821 (2009) (quoting Bob Herbert, Vital Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 31, 2002, at A27).  
 79.  See, e.g., Katy R. Jackman, Comment, Preserving the Writ: The Military Commission Act’s 
Unconstitutional Attempt to Deprive Lawful Resident Aliens of Their Habeas Corpus Rights, 67 MD. L. 
REV. 736, 736 (2008).  
 80.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long 
War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 910 (2009) 
(reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF 
TERROR (2008)).   
 81.  See also Tom Shields, I Can’t Believe It’s Not War. . .How They Rebranded a Fiasco, 
SUNDAY HERALD, July 31, 2005, at 20 (noting that the Bush administration “phase[d] out the phrase 
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struggled to negotiate the delicate balance between national security and 
civil liberties in times of crisis.  At times, the courts have strongly asserted 
their role as protectors of individual rights, and at others, they have failed 
to live up to their constitutional mandate.  These cases are important for 
three reasons.  First, they provide a way of understanding the predicament 
presented by cases such as Kiyemba v. Obama, illustrating lessons learned 
(or yet to be learned) from our past and explaining how we got here.82  
Second, they encourage us to think about the role of the courts as 
guarantors of individual liberty, which is pertinent for our purposes 
because, to the extent that courts are able to fashion meaningful habeas 
remedies, a significant individual right is protected.  Third, they offer a lens 
for evaluating a claim made by distinguished legal historian Mary Dudziak: 
That wartime is not the exception to the norm in American history, but the 
norm itself.83  If Dudziak is right, how should we understand what have 
been commonly called the “wartime cases,” and what is their lingering 
significance today, particularly in the context of the War on Terror, which 
numerous courts and commentators have defined as a potentially perpetual 
war?84 
A Historical Perspective 
Essential to placing Kiyemba I in its larger context is an understanding 
of how the courts have approached their role in times of war.  Kiyemba I 
presented to the Supreme Court an important question: What power does a 
habeas court have to issue a meaningful remedy?  At its core, Kiyemba I 
presents even simpler questions: What role should the courts play in the 
ongoing, potentially permanent, War on Terror, and what power do they 
have to remedy violations of individual rights made therein? 
As many have noted, the post 9-11 landscape is not the first context in 
which a debate over the role of courts in times of national crisis has 
arisen.85  Indeed, since the founding of this nation, jurists, lawmakers, and 
 
‘war against terror’” and “rebranded, or repositioned to use more nuanced language” the war as “‘the 
struggle against violent extremism’”); Alex Beam, Obama’s Newspeak, BOS. GLOBE, July 10, 2009, at 
42 (noting that the Obama administration later rebranded the ongoing conflict as the “overseas 
contingency operation”).   
 82.  For an interesting discussion of the legal significance of these kinds of “lessons from 
history,” focusing particularly on the precedential value of cases such as Ex Parte Quirin, Hirota, and 
Eisentrager, see Harlan Grant Cohen, “Undead” Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of 
History, 84 TUL. L. REV. 957 (2010). 
 83.  Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1670–71 
(2010).   
 84.  See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (“[I]f measured from September 11, 2001, to the 
present, [the War on Terror] is already among the longest wars in American history.”); Janelle Allen, 
Comment, Assessing the First Amendment as a Defense for Wikileaks and Other Publishers of 
Previously Undisclosed Government Information, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 783, 788 (2012) (describing the 
War on Terror as “seemingly perpetual”).  
 85.  See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, A Culture of Civil Liberties, 36 RUTGERS L. J., 825, 825 (2005); 
Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 459−60 (2003). 
VAUGHNS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/2013  1:16 PM 
20 ASIAN AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL [Volume 20:7 
scholars have debated both the extent to which courts should intervene in 
conflicts between national security and individual rights, and the balance 
that should be struck between those competing interests.  This area has 
been well hashed in the legal and historical literature,86 but a few 
significant case law examples are worth noting. 
In April 1861, one month after his inauguration, President Abraham 
Lincoln, motivated by a period of riots, bridge-burning, and “deep 
uneasiness” in the Baltimore-Washington area, authorized the suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus.87  One month later, Union soldiers 
apprehended John Merryman, a vocal opponent of President Lincoln, 
accusing him of various acts of treason.88  Upon his arrest, Merryman 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.89  Chief Justice Roger Taney, riding 
circuit in Maryland at the time, granted Merryman’s petition.90  Relying on 
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, the detaining officer 
refused to comply with the writ.91  Upon learning of the refusal to comply, 
Chief Justice Taney issued an oral statement from the bench, and several 
days later, produced a written opinion—Ex Parte Merryman.92  
Admonishing President Lincoln,93 Taney held that only Congress, and not 
the President acting alone, could suspend the writ.94  President Lincoln’s 
response was public.  In his July 4 address to a special session of Congress, 
he made a now-famous statement: 
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed, were 
being resisted, and failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the States.  
Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been 
perfectly clear, that by the use of the means necessary to their execution, 
some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen’s liberty, 
that practically, it relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent, should, 
to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question more directly, 
are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to 
 
 86.  See generally, e.g., DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE 
LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); Bruce Ackerman, Symposium: A New 
Constitutional Order?, Keynote Address, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
475 (2006); Frank J. Williams, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties—Then and Now: Old Wine in New 
Bottles, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 533 (2010); Wood, supra note 85.  
 87.  REHNQUIST, supra note 86, at 22–25. 
 88.  See generally Williams, supra note 86, at 533541 (describing the events surrounding 
Merryman’s arrest). 
 89.  See id.  
 90.  See id. at 541–42.  
 91.  See id. 
 92.  17 F. Cas. 144 (1861).  Ex Parte Merryman was technically issued as an opinion of the 
Circuit Court for the District of Maryland. Williams, supra note 88, at 542.  In his original opinion, 
however, Chief Justice Taney captioned the case “Before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States at Chambers.”  Id. For more on the precedential value of Merryman, see id. at 542−43.  
 93.  Merryman, 16 F. Cas. at 153.  
 94.  Id. at 148.   
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pieces, lest that one be violated?95 
The Lincoln-Taney show-down is an early example of the potential 
for conflict between the political and judicial branches in times of national 
crisis.  In Merryman, Taney staunchly asserted the courts’ role in protecting 
civil liberties in wartime, habeas corpus chief among them.96  As his July 4 
address made clear, for Lincoln, the habeas question was “a matter of 
national survival.”97  Although the Lincoln administration largely ignored 
Taney’s order, and although Congress later formally suspended habeas 
corpus,98 what matters most—as I develop below—was that a court, or at 
the very least, an individual justice, stood up for basic constitutional 
principles and the rule of law, even in the face of an incredible national 
crisis and the potential dissolution of the nation. 
More than eighty years later, the debate about the proper role of the 
courts in wartime was renewed in the context of various executive and 
legislative orders and enactments that, inter alia, required Japanese-
Americans living on the west coast to report to relocation centers, and later, 
resulted in the physical relocation of large numbers of Japanese-Americans 
to internment camps.99  Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-American living in 
 
 95.  Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 2 ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN: COMPLETE WORK 55 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., New York, Century Co. 1894); see 
also Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1839, 1867 n.107 (2010). 
 96.  To be sure, it is not uncontroversial to suggest that Taney’s position in Merryman represents 
support for the rule of law through protection of individual rights.  See, e.g., Jerrica A. Giles & Allen C.  
Guelzo, Colonel Utley’s Emancipation—Or, How Lincoln Offered to Buy a Slave, 3 MARQ. L. REV. 
1263, 1279 (2010) (suggesting that Taney’s opinion in Ex Parte Merryman constituted an effort “to 
obstruct the Union war effort” and was grounded in his continuing support of slavery); see also Emily 
Calhoun, The Accounting: Habeas Corpus and Enemy Combatants, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 136 n.275 
(2008) (“It is worth noting that Ex Parte Merryman as written by Justice Taney, himself responsible for 
endorsing a deprivation of liberty in Dred Scott . . . .”).  However, when separated from his most 
famous decision or to the extent that the two cases can be reconciled, Taney’s opinion in Merryman 
suggests that he viewed suspension of the writ as a simple matter of liberty—that the government could 
not detain a citizen without permitting him an opportunity to challenge his detention.  Timothy S. 
Huebner, Lincoln Versus Taney: Liberty, Power, and the Clash of the Constitutional Titans, 3 ALB. 
GOV’T L. REV. 615, 638−39 (2010).  Huebner offers the following explanation as a potential 
reconciliation of Chief justice Taney’s decisions in Merryman and Dred Scott:  
[T]he connection between Dred Scott and Merryman was that, in both instances, Taney 
[sought to] protect individual rights from the supposedly oppressive acts of the central 
government. From a modern perspective, of course, the notion of slaveholders possessing the 
right to own other human beings is both ludicrous and repulsive.  But viewed in the context of 
nineteenth century constitutional thought, Taney’s decisions in the two cases were of a piece. 
The Chief Justice saw protecting the rights of slaveholders from hostile congressional 
legislation as just as important as protecting the rights of Confederate sympathizers from 
unlawful arrest and detention. 
Id. 
 97.  Id. at 639; see also Ackerman, supra note 86, at 482 (“It was [Lincoln’s] insistence on saving 
the Union, at whatever the cost, that led him to suspend constitutional rights against arbitrary arrest and 
detention.”). 
 98.  REHNQUIST, supra note 86, at 39.  
 99.  Id. at 192–93.  
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California, was convicted of violating these exclusion orders.100  Korematsu 
challenged his conviction and the “draconian” relocation and internment 
requirement in federal court, eventually appealing the case to the United 
States Supreme Court.101  In Korematsu v. United States,102 a majority of 
the Court upheld the relocation and internment policy, deferring, with little 
question, to the military judgment of the political branches.103  Although 
the Court acknowledged the “hardships imposed by [the order] upon a large 
group of American citizens,” it nonetheless concluded that because 
“hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships,” the 
relocation and internment orders were constitutionally permissible.104  The 
majority’s opinion in Korematsu has been widely condemned,105 but never 
explicitly overturned.  Three justices—Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson—
issued staunch dissents.106 
What is significant, in our view, about the Merryman and Korematsu 
cases is that they represent moments in our history in which, due to 
ongoing war, the political branches took actions that denied important civil 
liberties to certain citizens and non-citizens alike.  Chief Justice Taney’s 
Merryman opinion may have been of little practical significance, and the 
Korematsu majority may have simply gotten it wrong, but at least a judicial 
officer—Taney himself in Merryman, the dissenting justices in 
Korematsu—commented on the violation, rising to assert the continued 
validity of civil liberties, even in times of crisis.  While much has been said 
about what can be learned from these cases, and the other “wartime cases,” 
what they perhaps best represent is the need for constructive judicial 
dissent from executive excess in times of national crisis.  Of course, such 
dissent, particularly in times of national crisis, may require judicial 
courage.107  An exercise of this courage in the Kiyemba cases—whether in 
the form of complete appellate review, or at the very least, a dissent from 
the Court’s earlier dismissal—might have reminded the lower courts, at the 
very least, of their responsibility to adhere to the Constitution, despite 
national security pressures. 
Although dissenting opinions have little value as legal precedent, they 
 
 100.  Id. at 193.  
 101.  See id. 
 102.  323 U.S. 214 (1945).  
 103.  See id. at 217−18. 
 104.  See id. at 219.  
 105.  See, e.g., COLE, supra note 86, at 99 (“While Korematsu itself has not been overruled, it is 
widely viewed with shame.  Eight of the nine sitting Justices on today’s Supreme Court have stated that 
Korematsu was wrongly decided; Justice Antonin Scalia has placed Korematsu on par with Dred 
Scott.”); Wood, supra note 85, at 469−70 (noting that “many of the lapses from the rule of law (such as 
the Japanese internments [and cases]) are now widely regarded as shameful episodes that should never 
be repeated”).  
 106.  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting); 
id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 107.  See Wood, supra note 85, at 469–70. 
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do put the ideas and core principles they state out into the world, where 
they may influence public opinion, future judicial rulings, or even, perhaps 
political decisions.  The potential to influence public opinion is especially 
significant where civil rights of unpopular groups are at stake, whether 
those are the rights of Japanese Americans during WWII or persons who 
are or perceived to be Muslims today.108 Furthermore, concurring and 
dissenting opinions also signal that the Court is not a united front on an 
issue, which is valuable at least in terms of determining how much weight 
to give to a judicial decision; and afford opportunities for overturning 
precedent in the future.  Moreover, they signal that careful consideration 
ought to be given to a divided court’s position on important issues 
involving individual rights, especially in national security cases. 
Concurring and dissenting opinions are thus very important in a democratic 
society.109 
B. Post-9/11 Jurisprudence 
On November 13, 2001, two months after September 11, President 
George W. Bush issued a military order authorizing the detention and trial 
by military commission of any non-citizen who the President had “reason 
to believe” was in any way affiliated with Al Qaeda or terrorism.110  The 
order also prohibited detainees from seeking judicial review of the status 
determination made by the President in the courts of the United States or in 
international tribunals.111  So began a series of cases and Congressional 
enactments that spoke directly to the role of the courts in times of national 
crisis. 
Over a four-year period, the Supreme Court, addressing for the first 
time the role of the courts in the context of the new War on Terror, made 
powerful assertions about that role and about the relationship between the 
courts and the political branches in times of war. In the first of a line of 
significant cases, the Court held in Rasul v. Bush112 that jurisdiction to 
“determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of 
[non-citizen] individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing” 
lies with the federal courts and that challenges to the legality of such 
 
 108.  See generally, e.g., COLE, supra note 86; see also Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002), which discusses the public and private discrimination directed towards 
Muslim and those perceived to be Muslim following September 11.   
 109.  See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).  
 110.  Military Order of November 13, 2001, §§ 3(a), 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 918, 919−20 (2002), reprinted 
in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. V. 2005).  See generally Kathleen M. McCarroll, With Liberty and Justice for 
All: The November 13, 2001 Military Order Allowing the Use of Military Tribunals to Try Those 
Suspected of Aiding Terrorists Violates the Rights Guaranteed to Non-Citizen United States Residents 
Under the Constitution, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 231,  233−34 (2003) (detailing the provisions of 
President Bush’s November 13, 2001 military order).  
 111.  Military Order of November 13, 2001, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 919. 
 112.  542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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detentions are to be presented through petitions for a writ of habeas 
corpus.113  The same day that it issued its opinion in Rasul, the Court ruled 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld114 that detainees115 are entitled to certain basic due 
process guarantees, including “notice of the factual basis for classification, 
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a 
neutral decisionmaker.”116 
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,117 finding 
that the recently-enacted Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,118 which 
purported to strip the federal judiciary of jurisdiction over the habeas 
petitions of all Guantanamo Bay detainees,119 did not apply to detainee 
cases pending at the time of the statute’s enactment.120  Shortly after the 
Court decided Hamdan, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 
2006,121 which amended the Detainee Treatment Act to explicitly include 
language stripping the courts of jurisdiction over pending cases. The 
Military Commissions Act also broadened the scope of the previous act, so 
that the restrictions on habeas petitions applied to all enemy combatant 
cases, whether the detainee was located at Guantanamo Bay, or not.122  The 
constitutionality of the latter statute was presented to the Supreme Court in 
Boumediene v. Bush,123 arguably the defining opinion of this period in the 
Court’s history, and the Court’s final word—to date—in the ongoing War 
on Terror.124 
In Boumediene, the Court held that the petitioners, a group of foreign 
nationals designated enemy combatants by the Executive and detained at 
Guantanamo Bay,125 are “entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to 
 
 113.  See id. at 483–85.   
 114.  542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).  
 115.  The opinion is arguably limited to American citizen detainees.  See Bruce Miller, No Virtue 
in Passivity: The Supreme Court and Ali Al-Marri, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 697, 726 (2011) (“The 
limited resolution offered by . . . Hamdi . . . to the questions raised by executive detention without trial 
is . . . narrowed even further by the fact that the detainee[] in [that] case[ was an] American citizen[.]  It 
is possible that the Justices’ opinion[] . . . [is] largely irrelevant to the fates of hundreds, or perhaps 
possibly thousands, of non-citizens held without trial in American military custody at various sites, 
known and unknown, around the world.”).  
 116.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.  
 117.  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 118.  The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e)(1), 119 
Stat. 2739 (2005). 
 119.  Id. § 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742−43. 
 120.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575–84.   
 121.  The Military Commissions Act, U.S.C.A § 2241(e)(7) (Supp. 2007)). 
 122.  Jackman, supra note 79, at 748-49 (citing The Military Commissions Act, supra note 121).  
 123.  553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 124.  See Megan Gaffney, Boumediene v. Bush: Legal Realism and the War on Terror, 44 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 197, 197 (2009) (“With Boumediene, the Court [firmly] asserted its role in the War on 
Terror.”).  
 125.  The facts of Boumediene are as follows: Lakhdar Boumediene, an Algerian national, was 
picked up, along with five other men, by American forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and transported to 
Guantanamo Bay in 2002, where they were classified as enemy combatants based on allegations that 
they were involved in terrorist activity.  Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. 
VAUGHNS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/12/2013  1:16 PM 
2013] OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS 25 
challenge the legality of their detention.”126  The Court also held that the 
procedures for reviewing the status designation of a detainee provided by 
Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act were unconstitutional because they 
did not provide an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.127  
Consequently, to the extent that the Military Commission Act operated to 
strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over the habeas petitions of 
Guantanamo detainees, that statute, the Court held, effected an 
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus.128 Justice Kennedy, writing 
for the majority, acknowledged the significance of the writ of habeas 
corpus, referring to it as a “time-tested device” that is central to the 
“delicate balance of governance,” and explaining that such a balance is 
itself “the surest safeguard of liberty.”129 
Just as significant as what Boumediene does say, is what it does not.  
The case does not address the Executive’s authority to detain the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees, nor does it hold that the writ must issue as to 
these particular detainees.130  Instead, the case holds only that the detainees 
are entitled to access to the writ; the contours of when, if at all, the writ 
must issue, or the appropriate remedy for the writ upon issuance are not 
addressed.  In the Court’s words, “[t]hese and other questions regarding the 
legality of the detention,” and presumably, the appropriate remedy if the 
detention is found unlawful, “are to be resolved in the first instance” by the 
trial court.131 
Thus, in the years immediately following 9/11, the Supreme Court 
took deliberate, if uneven, steps in the direction of affirmatively asserting 
its role as a guarantor of individual rights in the context of the War on 
Terror.  However, Boumediene—which was decided more than four years 
ago—remains the Court’s last word.  In 2010, eight petitions for certiorari 
related to the continued detention of various prisoners at Guantanamo Bay 
were presented to the Supreme Court.132  The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari as to seven of the eight petitions; the eighth petition was rendered 
moot.133  The Supreme Court’s recent silence in this arena is deafening.  As 
I discuss throughout this article, Kiyemba presented the Court with an 
opportunity to break its silence—to make clear rulings on specific remedial 
issues related to the habeas rights of the Guantanamo detainees and to 
 
REV. 89, 137 (2012) (noting that U.S. forces picked up these individuals “despite contrary orders from 
the highest court [in Bosnia], which had investigated all charges against Boumediene and the others 
only to find them baseless”).  The detainees remained at Guantanamo until their habeas petitions were 
considered by the Supreme Court in 2008.  Id.  
 126.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.  
 127.  See id. at 779–94.   
 128.  See id. at 792.  
 129.  Id. at 745.  
 130.  Id. at 733.  
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  See id. at 189.  
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reassert the judiciary’s ongoing role in securing individual rights in the War 
on Terror.  The Supreme Court missed this opportunity and others, leaving 
much unsaid. 
Justice O’Connor’s 2004 plurality opinion in Hamdi offered perhaps 
one of the strongest assertions of the continued and undiminished role of 
the judiciary in the War on Terror, an assertion that could have been 
reaffirmed, and reinvigorated, in Kiyemba.  She rejected “the 
Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a 
heavily circumscribed role for the courts” in this context, stating that such 
an assertion “serves only to condense power into a single branch of 
government.”134  Such concentration of power is contrary to established 
principles, Justice O’Connor states, as the Court has long “made clear that 
a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to 
[individual] rights.”135  Indeed, “[w]hatever power the United States 
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations 
or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 
stake.”136 By this metric, Kiyemba represents a tragically missed 
opportunity.  The case also represents a missed opportunity because, in the 
wake of Boumediene, the lower federal courts, and particularly the courts 
located in the District of Columbia, have tended (with some significant 
exceptions) not to delicately balance the competing interests of national 
security and civil liberties, but to tip the scales in near-absolute deference 
to the government’s security agenda—thus writing the very “blank check” 
that Justice O’Connor feared. 
In an important 2005 article, distinguished legal scholar Cass Sunstein 
termed this phenomenon “National Security Fundamentalism.”137 In the 
D.C. Circuit, where the large majority of cases pertaining to the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees have been heard, National Security 
Fundamentalism is ascendant.  Cass Sunstein characterizes the D.C. Court 
of Appeals’ approach to these cases as accepting a “highly deferential role 
for the judiciary” in cases where “national security is threatened.”138  Under 
this approach, “the president must be permitted to do what needs to be done 
to protect the country,” and the judiciary is, simply, to butt out.139  Six 
years later, Sunstein’s description of the approach of the D.C. courts to 
Guantanamo Bay cases remains on point.  Kiyemba I, and its reinstated and 
modified counterpart, Kiyemba III, are classic examples of a national 
 
 134.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36 (emphasis omitted).  
 135.  See id. at 536.  
 136.  Id.  
 137.  Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
693, 693 (2005).  
 138.  Id.  
 139.  See id.  
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security fundamentalist approach to a troubling question involving 
balancing national security and civil liberties. 
C. The Deteriorated Role of the Courts Post-9/11 
1. The Unreviewable Executive  and the Assertion of Inherent Power 
One week after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF),140 which authorized the President 
“to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
such organizations or persons.”141  The Bush administration “relied on the 
AUMF to argue that the scope of its ‘all necessary and appropriate force’ 
includes the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists as enemy 
combatants,” an approach that has been adopted, arguably, by the Obama 
administration.142  Moreover, President Bush’s November 13, 2001 
Military Order “authoriz[ed] the Secretary of Defense to detain any alien 
the president determined to be a member of al Qaeda; or who had engaged 
in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit international terrorism; or who 
had harbored someone who had done any of those acts.”143  The Military 
Order also provided that detainee trials would occur in military tribunals 
and denied the detainees “the right to seek recourse in any other tribunal, 
including state and federal courts.”144  Ostensibly, the government’s plan 
was to conduct its War on Terror without judicial intervention.  The 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Detainee Treatment and Military 
Commissions Acts are further evidence of this effort. 
Despite the Court’s efforts to ensure that the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees be accorded some semblance of procedural and substantive 
rights,145 the detainees nonetheless have found themselves in a “legal black 
hole.”146  The political branches repeatedly denied the detainees their 
rights. Further, court decisions regarding those rights are slow coming.  In 
many ways, the Bush administration attempted to create an effectively 
“unreviewable Executive,” as evidenced by the administration’s in-court 
arguments that the President has the authority to conduct counterterrorism 
 
 140.  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.). 
 141.  Id. (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544).   
 142.  A. Wallace Tashima, The War on Terror and the Rule of Law, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 245, 248 
(2008).  
 143.  Id. (citing Military Order of November 13, 2001, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 919).  
 144.  Id.  
 145.  See supra Part I.A.1.ii.   
 146.  See generally, e.g., Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 1 (2004); see also Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy 
Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 352 (2009) (describing Guantanamo Bay as a 
“law-free zone”).  
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measures without judicial intervention by virtue of his “inherent” war 
powers as “commander-in-chief.”147  Yet, despite the government’s lack of 
success in so arguing before the Supreme Court, few, if any, detainees have 
been released or transferred from the Guantanamo Bay facility without the 
government’s express acquiescence.148 
What are the origins of this approach?  In response to the first 
attempted terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Clinton 
administration adopted the traditional criminal investigative approach used 
by the FBI, followed by widely-covered jury trials held in the criminal 
justice system, successful court convictions, and long-term 
incarcerations.149  This was, as one commentator has noted, a 
“quintessentially American way of fighting terrorism,” which in the years 
following 9/11, “is becoming a rapidly fading memory.”150  In the days, 
weeks, and months following 9/11, the Bush administration argued that the 
magnitude of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the threat of future attacks, 
necessarily elevated the previously employed criminal justice paradigm to a 
war paradigm.151  Pursuant to the AUMF, President Bush ordered 
American forces into Afghanistan, where U.S. troops remain stationed 
 
 147.  See, e.g., Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the “War on Terrorism”: Normalizing the 
Exceptional After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 36 (2012); see also U.S. Const. art II, § 2 (the 
commander-in-chief clause).  The Obama Administration has, it appears, “all-but abandoned one of the 
hallmark arguments of the Bush administration—that the President has inherent power under the 
Commander-in-Chief clause of Article II to take measures he deems appropriate during wartime, and 
that congressional attempts to constrain that authority, to the extent they even apply, are 
unconstitutional.”  Stephen I. Vladeck, The Unreviewable Executive: Kiyemba, Maqaleh, and the 
Obama Administration, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 603, 604 (2010).   
 148.  See Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantanamo  Bay, 27 BERK. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (2009) 
(describing what she calls “the mystery of Guantanamo Bay”: “How can it be that nearly seven years 
after the first detainees arrived at the prison there—after numerous courtroom battles, the most 
significant of which resulted in defeats for the Bush Administration’s position—not a single detainee 
has ever been released, by order of any court or any other body in a position of authority, against the 
wishes of the Administration?”).  
 149.  Nathan Goetting, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012: Battlefield 
Earth, 68 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 247, 248 (2011) (“In 1995 Ramzi Yousef, Pakistani national, 
jihadist militant, and nephew of future 9/11 planner Khalid Muhammed, was arrested in Islamabad and 
extradited to New York where, upon being afforded his constitutional trial rights, the same as any other 
criminal defendant, he was convicted by a civilian judge in a federal district court for the 1993 bombing 
of the World Trade Center.  Since his conviction the U.S. criminal justice system has dealt with him 
severely and effectively. He is serving a life sentence in solitary confinement in the so-called ‘Alcatraz 
of the Rockies,’ the federal supermax prison in Colorado.”).   
 150.  See id. 
 151.  See President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State 
of the Union, 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 94, 96 (Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Bush State of the Union] 
(“I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all.  They view terrorism more as a 
crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments.  After the World Trade 
Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted and sent to 
prison.  But the matter was not settled.  The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations 
and drawing up more ambitious plans.  After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not 
enough to serve our enemies with legal papers.  The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the 
United States, and war is what they got.”).   
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today—the longest war in U.S. history.152  Pursuant to the November 2001 
Military Order, American troops began capturing, and subsequently 
detaining, hundreds of individuals at military camps.  Some detainees have 
now been in American custody for more than a decade.153  One might ask 
what explains the difference between the two approaches.  Arguably, one 
approach is in pursuit of a legal avenue for redress; the other permits 
Executive-level secrecy.  More than three thousand civilians lost their lives 
in the 2001 attacks, compared to the six who died in the 1993 bombing 
eight years earlier.154  The perpetrators of the 2001 attack on the World 
Trade Center and Pentagon were suicide actors; unlike the perpetrators of 
the 1993 bombing, none survived.  These significant differences presented 
the administration with an opportunity to turn to “the dark side” in meeting 
the new terrorist threat.155 
In declaring this a “war on terror,” the Bush administration followed 
previous administrations in declaring a policy-oriented war on a particular 
evil—this time, terrorism.156  But no previous administration had taken the 
notion of political war to this degree, modifying the war paradigm from 
mere rhetoric to actual military conflict, notwithstanding, in many 
instances, the nation’s Constitution, laws, and treaties.157  In conducting the 
War on Terror, the administration embarked down a slippery slope of 
governance in flagrant disregard of individual rights and civil liberties and 
without transparency, promising that it was protecting the nation against 
future terrorist threats.  Under this approach, the nation found itself falling 
into the nadir of unfulfilled constitutional guarantees and judicial 
oversight—or worse, neglect. 
As explained above, this behavior is not wholly surprising for 
presidents during wartime or a national emergency.  And although it is the 
courts’ role to protect individual rights and sanction their infringement, the 
Bush administration’s wartime detainee policies remained immune from 
judicial scrutiny until 2004.  Consequently, it was not until the Supreme 
Court’s 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush that the Uighurs gained access to 
the courts by habeas review.  Due to various legislative actions, that access 
 
 152.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).   
 153.  Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Beyond Guantanamo: Two Constitutional Objections to Nonmilitary 
Preventive Detention, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 491, 492 (2011) (noting the length of some detainees’ 
military detentions).  
 154.  Roberto Iraola, Enemy Combatants, the Courts, and the Constitution, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 565, 
570 n.23 (2003). 
 155.  See generally JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008) (describing how the decisions made post-
9/11 impacted constitutional rights).   
 156.  See Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1871 (2004) (“The Cold War.  
The War on Poverty.  The War on Crime.  The War on Drugs.  The War on Terrorism.  Apparently, it 
isn’t enough to call a high-priority initiative a High-Priority Initiative.  If it’s really important, only a 
wimp refuses to call it war.”).   
 157.  See id. at 1902. 
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was to be short lived.  Only upon issuance of the Boumediene decision did 
the Uighurs gain definitive access to the American judicial system.  Until 
that point, they had been languishing in indefinite detention for nearly six 
years.  Another year would pass before a federal court ordered their release.  
While some of the Uighur detainees were released pursuant to government 
agreements, none were released pursuant to court order.  If there ever was a 
time for the Court to act, to step in, acknowledge, and remedy a basic 
injustice, namely, the unlawful and ongoing detention of a group of 
individuals that present no threat to the security of the United States, but 
were the victims of an excessive executive approach post-9/11, surely that 
time was when the Court was presented with Kiyemba III. 
Perhaps what is most frustrating about the present situation is that it is 
entirely of the government’s own making. It was the government’s rush to 
action that resulted in the detention of a number of individuals entirely 
unrelated to terrorism.  In the Uighurs’ case, the government was aware 
early on that they were not terrorists, yet it persisted in treating them as 
such until it finally conceded otherwise.158  And in its external relocation 
efforts, the government is now attempting to foist the consequences of its 
own follies, forays, and missteps onto other countries, while refusing to 
consider internal relocation, which would allow it to claim responsibility 
for, and remedy, the wrongs of its own creation. 
In 2009, the Obama administration began to pursue fertile avenues for 
transferring the Uighurs into the continental interior of the United States.159  
But, “in the face of congressional objections,” largely registered by 
Republican critics, reigniting fear-mongering notions about releasing 
terrorists into our midst,160 “the White House lost its nerve.”161  These 
concerns, however, are a political matter—and should not influence the 
courts, as I describe below.  Once a habeas court has determined that 
detention is unlawful, political opposition to release locations should not 
alter the legal requirement to release them immediately, at the very least, as 
I have noted, pending the completion of external relocation negotiations.162  
Any other result undermines Boumediene, undermines the rule of law, and 
affords the Executive, in contravention of the separation of powers, 
unreviewable discretion to control the detention of individuals captured 
 
 158.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text.   
 159.  Carol Rosenberg, Why Obama Hasn’t Closed Guantanamo Camps, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 7, 
2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/07/2578082/why-obama-hasnt-closed-guantanamo.html; 
Samuel C. Kauffman, Guantanamo Bay Prison Inmates Cleared for Release Continue to Languish, 
OREGONIAN (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/01/guantanamo_bay_prison_inmates.html.   
 160.  See Barbara Ferguson, Scattering Begins of Detainees from Gitmo, ARAB NEWS, June 13, 
2009.  Similar rumblings were made when the Obama administration made efforts to conduct terrorist 
trials in the American federal criminal system.   
 161.  Rosenberg, supra note 159.  
 162.  See infra Part IA. 
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during the War on Terror—even individuals long-ago found to be innocent 
of wrongdoing. 
2. The Undermining of the Rule of Law 
As history will recall, in May 1977, former President Richard M. 
Nixon famously told British interviewer David Frost that “when the 
President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”163  The Bush 
administration, taking a page out of Nixon’s playbook, used various tactics, 
apparently effectively, to “dismantle constitutional checks and balances and 
to circumvent the rule of law.”164  In so doing, the administration took 
advantage of 9/11 to assert “the most staggering view of unlimited 
presidential power since Nixon’s assertion of imperial prerogatives.”165  
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Kiyemba III, reinstating as modified its 
opinion in Kiyemba I, is, as I have noted, now governing precedent. That 
earlier opinion, adopting a view that the government had argued all along, 
re-characterizes the law pertaining to detainees at Guantanamo Bay as a 
matter of immigration.  Immigration is an area of law where the sovereign 
prerogative on which an individual is admitted or excluded from entry into 
the United States is virtually immune from judicial review.166  The Bush 
administration long ago adopted the position that judicial review of its 
detention policies would frustrate its war efforts and its Commander-in-
Chief authority, so that efforts to fit Kiyemba within the immigration 
framework worked to the government’s benefit.  But, as the Boumediene 
Court explained, “the exercise of [the Executive’s Commander-in-Chief] 
powers is vindicated, not eroded, when [or if] confirmed” by the 
judiciary.167 
In 2007, Ninth Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima observed that the 
rule of law—touted by the United States throughout the world since the end 
of World War II—has been “steadily undermined . . . since we began the 
so-called ‘War on Terror.’”168  “The American legal messenger,” Tashima 
 
 163.  DAVID FROST, FROST/NIXON: BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE NIXON INTERVIEWS 89 (2007); 
Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 
1977, at A16; see generally FROST/NIXON (Universal Pictures 2008).  
 164.  CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007) (describing the Bush Administration’s policies as 
creating an “imperial Presidency”).  
 165.  Robin Lindley, The Return of the Imperial Presidency: An Interview with Charlie Savage, 
HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 7, 2008), http://hnn.us/node/44951 (quote is taken from Lindley’s pre-
interview remarks). 
 166.  The first clue is that the Uighurs are referred to by the D.C. Circuit as “aliens,” which is a 
term of art found in the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Characterizing the Uighurs as aliens places 
them in the orbit of immigration law, when in reality, they are foreign nationals not seeking to 
immigrate to this country.  Rather, they are seeking release as part of the substantive remedy required 
for determined unlawful detention. 
 167.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797. 
 168.  Tashima, supra note 142, at 245.  
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notes, “has been regarded throughout the world as a trusted figure of 
goodwill, mainly by virtue of close identification with the message borne: 
that the rule of law is fundamental to a free, open, and pluralistic society,” 
that the United States represents “a government of laws and not of 
persons,” and that “no one—not even the President—is above the law.”169  
But, according to Tashima, the actions that the United States has “taken in 
the War on Terror, especially [through] our detention policies, have belied 
our commitment to the rule of law and caused [a] dramatic shift in world 
opinion,” so that the War on Terror has been greeted internationally with 
“increasing skepticism and even hostility.”170  Put differently, the United 
States has shot the messenger—and with it, goes the message, the 
commitment to the rule of law, and our international credibility. 
The primary assassin in this “assault on the role of law” is the 
argument “that the President is not bound by law—that he can flout the 
Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States as Commander-in-
Chief during times of war.”171  Also wreaking havoc on the rule of law is 
the notion, described above, that the President’s actions in times of war are 
unreviewable, and that the judiciary has no role to play in checking 
wartime policies—a notion perpetuated by placement of issues like those 
raised in Kiyemba within the immigration framework. 
How can the Executive take such an approach as its legal defense, 
despite swearing, upon inauguration, to “preserve, protect[,] and defend the 
Constitution of the United States,”172 and despite constitutional directive 
that he “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”?173  As 
distinguished co-authors Charles Fried and Gregory Fried observe, the oath 
of office does not mention defending national security.174  Rather, “the 
president’s duty is explicitly to the law, not [to] some vague goal beyond 
the law.”175  According to these authors, “[t]he law is our defense against 
tyranny, the arbitrary imposition of one person’s will over all others, and 
against anarchy, the ungoverned combat of many people’s wills.”176  If, as 
the Executive has done since 9/11, “we cut down the laws to lay hold of 
our enemies,” where are we to “hide when the Devil turns round on us, 
armed with the power of the state?”177  If a reminder of the oath 
undertaken, the values underlying it, and the need to engage all three 
branches of government in protecting those values were necessary, the 
 
 169.  Id.  
 170.  Id.   
 171.  Id. at 246. 
 172.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.  
 173.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.  
 174.  CHARLES FRIED & GREGORY FRIED, BECAUSE IT IS WRONG: TORTURE, PRIVACY AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE AGE OF TERROR 152 (2010). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 129.   
 177.  Id. 
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Executive would need to look no further than the pages of the Supreme 
Court Reporter. 
In Ex Parte Milligan,178  for example, the Supreme Court stated that 
the Constitution “is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in 
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all 
times, and under all circumstances.”179  Central to this protection is the 
separation of powers, by which one branch of government is not permitted 
to go unchecked.  Indeed, as Justice O’Connor stated in the Hamdi case, 
“[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations 
in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches 
when individual liberties are at stake.”180  And even the Executive’s war 
power “does not remove constitutional limitations,” including the 
separation of powers, “safeguarding essential liberties.”181 
According to the Milligan Court, the founding fathers “knew—the 
history of the world told them—the nation they were founding, be its 
existence short or long, would be involved in war.”182  How frequently or 
of what length, “human foresight could not tell.”183  But, the founders knew 
that “unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially 
hazardous to freemen.”184  For this reason, “they secured the inheritance 
they had fought to maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution the 
safeguards which time had proved were essential to its preservation.”185  
These safeguards cannot be disturbed by any one branch, unless the 
Constitution so provides—and with the checks authorized therein.186  
Indeed, “[t]o hold [that] the political branches have the power to switch the 
Constitution on or off at will . . . would permit a striking anomaly in our 
tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and 
the President, not [the courts], say ‘what the law is.’”187  And “our basic 
charter cannot be contracted away like this.”188  To the extent that it has 
been—through executive action, paired with judicial inaction—the rule of 
law is undermined.  We can and we must do better.  The Constitution, and 
those who drafted it, would demand so. 
 
 178.  71 U.S. 2 (1866).  
 179.  Id. at 120-21. 
 180.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.  
 181.  Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934); see also Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[It was] the central judgment of the Framers . . . that, within 
our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential 
to the preservation of liberty.”).   
 182.  Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 125. 
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id.   
 185.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 186.  See id.  
 187.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).  
 188.  Id. 
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By reconsidering the opportunities presented, and missed, by the 
Kiyemba v. Obama case, we might see ways that we could do better, ways 
that we could restore the rule of law to its rightful place in our system of 
government and in that government’s policy choices. 
III. RE-CONSIDERING KIYEMBA V. OBAMA: THE ILLEGALITY OF 
INDEFINITE DETENTION, THE INAPPLICABILITY OF 
IMMIGRATION LAW, AND CHECKING THE UNCHECKED 
EXECUTIVE 
A. The Illegality of Indefinite Detention and the Remedy Requirement 
The writ of habeas corpus, “derived from the Latin meaning ‘you have 
the body’” and incorporated into American law from the British common 
law, safeguards individual liberty “by affording people seized by the 
government the right to question the grounds for their detention before a 
judge.”189  The writ does more than “protect the freedom of the individual 
from unlawful restraint.”190  It also represents “an important structural 
function in our constitutional system,” ensuring “checks and balances 
among the branches” and “adherence to the rule of law.”191  Put simply, the 
writ protects against indefinite and unchecked detention. 
While the scope of the writ and its continued viability remain the 
subject of significant debate, most scholars and jurists agree that the 
Suspension Clause, the writ’s constitutional enshrinement, “protects the 
writ ‘as it existed in 1789.’”192  But as distinguished legal scholar Stephen 
Vladeck notes in a 2011 book review, however, “that limited point of 
consensus begs a separate question: what was the scope of the writ” at the 
time of the founding?193  While jurists and scholars have reached differing 
conclusions on that point, evidence suggests that habeas, as understood by 
the framers, included a guarantee of relief.  Such evidence indicates that the 
habeas remedy, as much as access to the writ itself, is an essential part of 
the constitutional guarantee.194  Moreover, the early framers viewed habeas 
 
 189.  Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During the Lincoln and Bush 
Presidencies, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2009).  Following its common law incorporation, the writ 
was enshrined in the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  
U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 9, cl. 2. 
 190.  Hafetz, supra note 189, at 400.   
 191.  Id.  
 192.  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Stephen I. Vladeck, Book Review, The New 
Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 942 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS 
CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (Harv. Univ. Press 2010)).  
 193.  Vladeck, supra note 192, at 942.  
 194.  See generally Brief of Scholars of Nineteenth-Century American Legal History as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (2008) (arguing that United States 
v. Libellants & Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841) provides early American 
precedent for the release of the Uighurs into the United States); Brief of Retired Federal Judges as 
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as “an essential check on executive power,”195 and the ultimate guarantor of 
individual liberties.  Alexander Hamilton, quoting Blackstone, referred to 
habeas as “the bulwark of our liberties,” and, like others, thought habeas to 
be “such a powerful check on tyranny that a separate Bill of Rights was 
unnecessary.”196  Indeed, as Justice Salmon Chase noted in 1868, almost 
one hundred years after the founding, “The great writ of habeas corpus has 
been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal 
freedom.”197  It has been, stated differently, the most esteemed of 
constitutional rights.  It would make little sense, in view of this long 
history, for the right to come unaccompanied by a meaningful remedy. 
The dissent in Hamdi drives this point home.  According to Justice 
Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, nothing short of bringing criminal 
charges (if sufficient evidence warranted such charges) would permit an 
American citizen’s continued detention at Guantanamo Bay.198  Without 
such charges, an unqualified release from indefinite detention was 
necessary.199  Because the Constitution speaks of “persons” and not 
“citizens” in the Bill of Rights, the same is, likely, true for noncitizens 
cleared of all terrorist-related activity, such as the Uighurs.  But, since 
Hamdi, the Supreme Court has not again considered the appropriate 
remedy for a successful habeas petitioner.200  Rather, the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion in Kiyemba I as modified on remand, remains the final word on the 
matter.  Because that court mischaracterized Kiyemba as an immigration 
case, as I explain below, rather than a case involving the habeas right and 
its corresponding remedy, the enduring nature of the writ remains up in the 
air. 
The habeas right’s jurisprudential pedigree is outstanding: indeed, its 
origins are firmly planted in the thirteenth century’s Magna Carta.201  The 
plenary power doctrine—the immigration doctrine on which the D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion rests, on grounds arguably based in national security 
fundamentalism202—is a judicial creation of the late nineteenth century.203 
 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (arguing that “release 
from unlawful Executive detention” is the only remedy “that is faithful to the Framers’ separation-of-
powers scheme and fulfills the fundamental promise of habeas”).  
 195.  Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension 
Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2010).   
 196.  Redish & McNamara, supra, note 195, at 1369–70 (citing The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander 
Hamilton)).  
 197.  Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).  
 198.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 199.  See id.  
 200.  See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 39 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The 
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement regarding Guantanamo detainees assured them certain 
procedural guarantees, but hedged when discussing remedy.”).  Hamdi was, of course, decided prior to 
Boumediene.  
 201.  Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 691–92 (2009).  
 202.  The commitment to application of the plenary power doctrine permits the political branches 
virtual carte blanche over detainees, as immigration matters are largely immune from judicial review.  
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It should not trump rights long embedded in our constitutional history. 
B. The Inapplicability of Immigration Law 
Distinguished immigration law professor Stephen Legomsky once 
wrote, “[i]mmigration law is a constitutional oddity.”204  The oddity began 
in the late nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court handed down a pair 
of cases declaring that Congress possesses a “plenary power” to regulate 
immigration law—to exclude and expel those immigrants who seek 
admission (or are admitted) into the United States, whether temporarily or 
as permanent residents.  These foundational cases are Ping v. United States, 
commonly known as The Chinese Exclusion Case,205 and Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, which could properly be called The Chinese Expulsion 
Case.206  In the former case, which involved the exclusion of a returning 
permanent resident under certain statutory enactments, the Supreme Court 
established the plenary power doctrine.207  In the latter case, the Supreme 
Court extended the plenary power doctrine to deportation proceedings.208  
Scholars have long considered both cases shameful precedents sanctioning 
legislation explicitly based on racial grounds.209 
Ping involved a returning Chinese national seeking readmission into 
the United States.210  Ping had resided in the United States prior to his trip 
to China to visit family and friends, and had obtained the requisite 
certificate to return to his lawful residence.211  However, as Ping was en 
route back to the United States, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion 
Act, barring the admission of racially ethnic Chinese individuals into the 
continental United States.212  Ting involved the deportation of a resident 
Chinese national who did not have a certificate of lawful presence signed 
 
For a case illustrating this immunity, see Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 
(1909).  
 203.  See Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
 204.  Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 
1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984); see Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 
COL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (“Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and 
divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional right, and judicial role that animate the rest of 
our legal system.”).  
 205.  130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 206.  149 U.S. 698 (1893).  
 207.  Ping, 130 U.S. at 600-11. 
 208.  Ting, 149 U.S. at 711-14.  
 209.  See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 305 (2d ed. 1996); 
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?: Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, 
and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 503 (2001); Franciso Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical 
Pedagogy, and Social Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65, 65 
(2003).  
 210.  Ping, 130 U.S. at 581. 
 211.  Id. at 581–82.  
 212.  Id. at 589–90.  
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by a white witness.213  Endorsing the racially-motivated legislation in both 
cases, the Court attributed the source of the federal power of immigration 
to international law—specifically, to the notion of a sovereign prerogative 
exercised in the national interest.214 
Indeed, in another significant immigration case, Ekiu v. United 
States,215 the Court declared it an accepted maxim of international law that 
“every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its 
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions 
as it may see fit to prescribe.”216  Pursuant to this maxim, the Court 
reaffirmed the plenary power doctrine.217 
Under that doctrine, the political branches’ authority to exercise power 
over immigration matters is considered absolute as a matter of substantive 
policy choices regarding who may enter, and remain within the continental 
United States218—notwithstanding the fact that no express authority to 
regulate immigration exists within any of Congress’s constitutionally 
enumerated powers.219  The doctrine, however, is subject to some 
constitutional limitations.220  Indeed, where the legislative reach extends in 
some meaningful way beyond admission, entry, exclusion, or deportation, 
the full panoply of constitutional rights may be triggered.  In Yamataya v. 
Fisher,221 for example, the Court observed that “administrative officers, 
when executing the provisions of a[n immigration] statute involving the 
 
 213.  Ting, 149 U.S. at 698.  For more on this line of cases and the cultural atmosphere in which 
both the statutes and the cases were enacted and handed down, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY AND 
CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE LAW & POLICY 119 (5th ed. 2009) (citing FRANK 
F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE 3–4 (1976)).   
 214.  See id. at 119–20.  
 215.  142 U.S. 651 (1892).  
 216.  Id. at 659.  
 217.  Id. at 651-64 (citing to Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581, 604-609 (1889)); see also Fong Yue 
Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); cf. Janel Thamkul, The Plenary Power-Shaped Hole in the Core 
Constitutional Law Curriculum: Exclusion, Unequal Protection, and American National Identity, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 553, 555 (2008) (indicating that Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting are the two key 
constitutional cases establishing the plenary power doctrine in immigration law.). 
 218.  Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218–28 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (drawing a distinction between substantive and procedural due process, and noting that the 
former is more susceptible to political whims, while the later must be fiercely guarded by the judiciary); 
id. at 218-24 (“Substantively, due process of law renders what is due to a strong state as well as to a free 
individual. It tolerates all reasonable measures to insure the national safety, and it leaves a large, at 
times a potentially dangerous, latitude for executive judgment as to policies and means. . . . Procedural 
fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due process of law, is at least what it most 
uncompromisingly requires. Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive 
due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to legislative 
judgment. Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the competence of 
the judiciary on which they do not bend before political branches of the Government, as they should on 
matters of policy which compromise substantive law.”).   
 219.  LEGOMSKY, supra note 213, at 115–16. 
 220.  Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). 
 221.  189 U.S. 86 (1903).  
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liberty of persons,” whether or not those persons entered the country 
lawfully, may not “disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due 
process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution.”222  Similarly, in Wong Wing v. United States, the Court 
invalidated a provision in the Chinese Exclusion Act that imprisoned 
Chinese persons found to be unlawfully present in the United States and 
punished with hard labor or deportation, explaining that the legislation 
exceeded matters within the purview of immigration.223 
In these cases, constitutional guarantees trumped the plenary power 
doctrine.  Put differently, in Yamataya and Wong Wing, the Supreme Court 
found that Congress had overstepped the boundary of authority created by 
the plenary power doctrine, and veered into an area of substantive and 
procedural constitutional rights.  Kiyemba presents a similar case.  As the 
first judge to hear the Uighurs’ claims noted, the fundamental sovereign 
right to exclude or expel aliens from the interior of the United States “does 
not mean that the third branch is frozen in place,” unable to step in where 
constitutional rights are at stake.224  Rather, the branches should be guided 
by “the principle that personal liberty is secured by adherence to separation 
of powers.”225 
The district judge presiding over the Uighurs’ petitions was prepared 
to order their release, pending a hearing on the precise contours of that 
release. The release remedy certainly would have been conditional, as the 
Uighurs would have no immigration status.  As a statutory matter, 
however, release would have been possible under the Executive’s parole 
power.  The Immigration and Nationality Act226 gives the Executive the 
authority to exercise the parole power when a significant public interest or 
urgent humanitarian concern is implicated.227  Both factors are present in 
the Uighurs’ case.  First, a strong argument can be made that the Uighurs’ 
situation presents a significant public interest: Their continued detention 
has been judicially declared unlawful.  Consistent with adherence to the 
rule of law, they should have been released as soon as judicially-
determined conditions were established.228  Second, as for the urgency of 
 
 222.  Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100.  
 223.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38_(1896). 
 224.  See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42 n.5 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 225.  Id. at 42 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 226.  Pub. L. 89-236 (1965) [hereinafter INA].  
 227.  Id. § 212(d)(5)(A).  
 228.  See, e.g., Brian R. Farrell, Access to Habeas Corpus: A Human Rights Analysis of U.S. 
Practices in the War on Terrorism, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 6 (2011) (“By providing 
this judicial check on executive authority, habeas corpus ensures compliance with the rule of law.”); 
Douglass Cassel, Liberty, Judicial Review, and the Rule of Law at Guantanamo: A Battle Half Won, 43 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 37 (2008) (describing the Boumediene decision as one in which the Court 
“defended individual liberty, judicial review . . ., and ultimately the rule of law”); Emily Calhoun, The 
Accounting: Habeas Corpus and Enemy Combatants, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 136 (2008) (“[T]he 
Great Writ gives the judicial branch of government a crucial rule-of-law function.”). 
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the humanitarian concern, it was the Executive’s action in prosecuting its 
“War on Terror” that created this situation—not the conduct of the 
Uighurs.  Moreover, the duration of their detention, particularly in light of 
the fact that they are not now nor were they ever really enemy combatants, 
adds urgency to the humanitarian concern.  Thus, an Executive grant of 
parole would have been a viable option in this case, if the Executive was 
ever serious about facilitating the Uighurs’ release through the immigration 
law mechanism. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated previously that an individual 
paroled into the United States is not considered to have been admitted or 
gained immigration status.229  As such, the D.C. Circuit’s rationale about a 
judge’s inability to accord them immigration status simply does not figure 
into a judicially-ordered release remedy.  In any event,  though assignment 
of an immigration status is not required to facilitate the Uighurs’ release, 
the fact is that, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court determined that the 
Guantanamo Bay naval base is, as a functional matter, a part of the 
sovereign territory of the United States, such that the Suspension Clause 
must run there.230  Because Guantanamo Bay, the site of the Uighurs’ 
detention, has been deemed a part of the territory of the United States, the 
proverbial ship, to wit, the idea that the Uighurs’ release involves 
“admission” into U.S. territory, has already sailed. 
C. The Release Remedy 
The Kiyemba litigation is about the need for an appropriate habeas 
remedy.  As such, immigration law does not prohibit the courts from 
ordering release into the interior of the United States as a constitutionally 
required remedy for unlawful detention.  And because this is a habeas 
matter and not a case about aliens seeking admission, an order releasing 
these petitioners into the interior of the United States does not invade the 
sovereign prerogative of the political branches of government to make 
admission decisions pursuant to this country’s immigration laws.  Yet, even 
in immigration cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the right—at least 
as a statutory matter, grounded in constitutional concerns—of noncitizens 
who are indefinitely detained to be released conditionally.  For example, in 
Zadvydas v. Davis231 and Clark v. Martinez,232 two cases that are, 
admittedly, not strictly analogous to the Uighurs’ case, the Supreme Court 
 
 229.  Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).  
 230.  In so doing, the Court rejected the geographic formalism of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763 (1950). See Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 235 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that after balancing 
the factors articulated in Boumediene, American courts had jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions of 
detainees held at the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan).  But see Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that habeas jurisdiction did not run to Bagram under the factors stated in 
Boumediene).   
 231.  533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 232.  543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
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found no congressional intent in the governing immigration statute to 
detain noncitizens indefinitely, including those who are treated, for various 
reasons, as not having made entry under immigration law. 
In Zadvydas, the Court found that lawful permanent residents who had 
been ordered deported, but lacked any place to relocate, could not be 
detained indefinitely following their removal proceedings.233  Although the 
Court’s decision in this case was based on statutory grounds, the Court 
nonetheless recognized that the immigration power was subject to 
constitutional constraints.234  In Martinez, the Court extended its ruling in 
Zadvydas, which was decided on statutory interpretation grounds, to Cuban 
immigrants, who through the entry fiction and despite their physical 
presence in the interior of the United States, are without constitutional 
rights whatsoever.  In each case, the Court interpreted the governing statute 
as only authorizing the government to detain noncitizens for a 
presumptively reasonable period; once removal from this country to 
another location is no longer “reasonably foreseeable,” the continued 
detention of the noncitizens is no longer permissible, and the government 
must conditionally release them.235 
As for Kiyemba, in the district court, the government asserted that the 
Executive may detain individuals pursuant to its inherent “wind-up” 
authority, the purported authority to detain individuals associated with a 
conflict for some period of time following the end of that conflict.236  It 
then argued that Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei237 “provides a 
better read on the constitutional limits to detention than either Zadvydas or 
Clark.”238  Mezei is a case that involved “an alien immigrant permanently 
excluded from the United States on security grounds but stranded in his 
temporary haven on Ellis Island because other countries [would] not take 
him back.”239  The district court, reviewing the Uighurs’ petitions, found 
several very important distinctions between Mezei and the petitions before 
the court: First, Mezei was an immigration case; Kiyemba is not. Unlike in 
Mezei, the Uighurs are not seeking immigrant admission to the United 
 
 233.  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (“In our view, the statute, read in light of the Constitution’s 
demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring 
about that alien’s removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention [after removal 
proceedings are complete].”).  
 234.  Id.  
 235.  Id. at 700–01 (observing that the court believed that Congress doubted the constitutionality of 
detention that lasted longer than six months.).  It is worth noting that, in the context of the Guantanamo 
Bay detainees, Boumediene guaranteed the detainees “some form of ‘conditional release’ if [it is found 
that] there is no basis for their detention.”  Arandes, supra note 7, at 1081 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)).   
 236.  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2008).   
 237.  345 U.S. 206 (1953).  
 238.  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 37. 
 239.  Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207.  
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States.240  Second, in Mezei, the lower court was not aware of the evidence 
against the petitioner’s admission because it was confidential and 
undisclosed; in the case of the Uighurs, the government presented evidence 
supposedly “justifying” their detention, but “failed to meet its burden.”241  
Consequently, the court concluded—”[d]rawing from the principles 
espoused in the Clark and Zadvydas cases and from the Executive’s 
authority as Commander in Chief”—that the asserted constitutional 
authority to “wind up” matters administratively prior to release had 
ceased.242  I agree. 
Relying on Mezei, and largely ignoring Boumediene,243 the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court lacked the requisite 
authority to order the government to admit the Uighurs into the continental 
United States.  In so doing, the court refused to appreciate a key distinction: 
The habeas court would not be ordering the admission of the Uighurs into 
the United States under immigration law.  Rather, their release is mandated 
by the constitutional guarantee of habeas relief, particularly as the Uighurs’ 
plight was in no way of their own making.244  In light of the foregoing, it is 
clear that, until the Supreme Court explicitly rules on the constitutional 
remedy available to such detainees (as distinguished from the right to 
challenge the lawfulness of their detention, which was established by 
Boumediene), the D.C. Circuit will continue to misguidedly apply 
immigration law to an issue plainly outside of its purview, with the effect 
of granting nearly unreviewable discretion to the Executive and therefore, 
leaving the Uighurs indefinitely and unlawfully detained at Guantanamo 
Bay until the Executive is able to secure a relocation destination. 
As stated in the Uighurs’ certiorari petition, as a constitutional matter, 
“the President’s discretionary release of a prisoner is no different from his 
discretionary imprisonment: each proceeds from unchecked power.”245  To 
 
 240.  See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (“[T]he Mezei petitioner, 
unlike the [Uighurs], came voluntarily to the United States, seeking admission.” (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. 
at 208)).  
 241.  Id. (stating that the evidence was presented pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act).  
 242.  Id. at 38-39. 
 243.  Concurring in the judgment, Judge Rogers found the majority’s analysis to be “not faithful to 
Boumediene.”  Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1032 (Rogers, J., concurring).  The majority’s analysis, Judge 
Rogers continues, “compromises both the Great Writ as a check on arbitrary detention, effectively 
suspending the writ contrary to the Suspension Clause . . . , and the balance of powers regarding 
exclusion and admission and release of aliens into the country. . . to reside in the Congress, the 
Executive, and the habeas court.”  Id.   
 244.  The government had expressed concerns, during briefings, that releasing the Uighurs into the 
United States might mean that foreign enemies would dump “volunteers” on our doorstep, knowing that 
they could eventually be released into the United States.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Kiyemba, 
130 S. Ct. 458  (No. 08-1234). That concern should have no sway in the Uighurs’ case however: The 
Uighurs were present at Guantanamo solely as a result of the government’s post-9/11 tactics, as 
described above. Mezei does not hold, as the government wishes, that it can be shielded from problems 
of its own making.  
 245.  Id. at 34-35. 
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view the question of release as based on sovereign prerogative in the 
administration of immigration law, while viewing the question of 
imprisonment as based on constitutional authority is, put simply, senseless 
and without precedent.  It cannot be that the two inquiries are unrelated; 
they both undoubtedly implicate individual constitutional rights and the 
separation of powers.  Having refused to resolve this matter, the Supreme 
Court has left the separation of powers out of balance and tilting 
dangerously toward unilateralism. 
D. The Unchecked Executive: The Politics of Judicial Abstention 
After being reversed three times in a row in Rasul, Hamdan, and then 
Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit finally managed in Kiyemba to reassert, and 
have effectively sanctioned, its highly deferential stance towards the 
Executive in cases involving national security.  In particular, the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that an order mandating the Uighurs’ release into the 
continental United States would impermissibly interfere with the political 
branches’ exclusive authority over immigration matters.  But this reasoning 
is legal ground that the Supreme Court has already implicitly—and another 
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit more explicitly—covered earlier. As 
such, the Bush administration’s strategy in employing the “war” paradigm 
at all costs and without any judicial intervention, while unsuccessful in the 
Supreme Court, has finally paid off in troubling, and binding, fashion in the 
D.C. Court of Appeals, where, national security fundamentalism reigns 
supreme and the Executive’s powers as “Commander-in-Chief” can be 
exercised with little, if any, real check; arguably leading to judicial 
abstention in cases involving national security. 
The consequences of the Kiyemba decision potentially continue today, 
for example, with passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 
2012,246 which President Obama signed, with reservations, into law on 
December 31, 2011.247  This defense authorization bill contains detainee 
provisions that civil liberties groups and human rights advocates have 
strongly opposed.248  The bill’s supporters strenuously objected to the 
assertion that these provisions authorize the indefinite detention of U.S. 
citizens.249 In signing the bill, President Obama later issued a statement to 
 
 246.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. (2011). 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1540enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr1540enr.pdf.  
 247.  David Nakamura, Obama Signs Defense Bill, Pledges to Maintain Legal Rights of U.S. 
Citizens, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-signs-defense-
bill-pledges-to-maintain-legal-rights-of-terror-suspects/2011/12/31/gIQATzbkSP_story.html. 
 248.  See, e.g., Indefinite Detention, Endless Worldwide War and the 2012 National Defense 
Authorization Act, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/indefinite-
detention-endless-worldwide-war-and-2012-national-defense-authorization-act.  
 249.  See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez & Joby Warrick, Congress Sends Defense Bill to Obama After 
Reworking Detainee Provisions, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress-sends-defense-bill-to-obama-after-reworking-
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the effect that although he had reservations about some of the provisions, 
he “vowed to use discretion when applying” them.250  Of course, that does 
not mean another administration would do the same, especially if courts 
abstain from their role as protectors of individual rights. 
In the years after 9/11, the Supreme Court asserted its role 
incrementally, slowly entering into the debate about the rights of enemy 
combatant detainees.  This was a “somewhat novel role” for the Court.251  
Unsurprisingly, in so doing, the Court’s intervention “strengthened 
detainee rights, enlarged the role of the judiciary, and rebuked broad 
assertions of executive power.”252  Also unsurprisingly, the Court’s 
decisions in this arena “prompted strong reactions from the other two 
branches.”253  This may be so because, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, 
the Court had, in the past, recognized the primacy of liberty interests only 
in quieter times, after national emergencies had terminated or perhaps 
before they ever began.254  However, since the twentieth century, wartime 
has been the “normal state of affairs.”255  If perpetual war is the new 
“normal,” the political branches likely will be in a permanent state of alert.  
Thus, it remains for the courts to exercise vigilance and courage about 
protecting individual rights, even if these assertions of judicial authority 
come as a surprise to the political branches of government.256  But courts, 
like any other institution, are susceptible to being swayed by influences 
external to the law.  Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf make this very 
point in a 2011 article, noting that much of the post-9/11 scholarship 
mirrors this country’s early wartime cases and “envisions a country that 
veers off course at the onset of a military emergency but gradually steers 
back to a peacetime norm once the threat recedes, via primarily legal 
interventions.”257  This model, they state, “cannot explain a sudden return 
to the repressive wilderness just at the moment when it seemed the country 
had recovered its moral bearings.”258  Kiyemba is very much a return to the 
repressive wilderness. 
In thinking about the practical and political considerations that 
inevitably play a role in judicial decisionmaking (or non-decisionmaking, 
as the case may be), I note that the Court tends to be reluctant to decide 
 
detainee-provisions/2011/12/15/gIQAh1vhwO_story.html. 
 250.  Nakamura, supra note 247. Obama further stated that his Administration would “not 
authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens.” Id. 
 251.  Josh Benson, Comment, The Guantánamo Game: A Public choice Perspective on Judicial 
Review in Wartime, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1219, 1219 (2009).  
 252.  Id.  
 253.  Id. 
 254.  REHNQUIST, supra note 86, at 15.  
 255.  Dudziak, supra note 83, at 1698 n.173. 
 256.  See generally Wood, supra note 85.   
 257.  Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 456 
(2011).  
 258.  Id.  
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constitutional cases if it can avoid doing so, as it did in Kiyemba.  
Arguably, this doctrine of judicial abstention is tied to concerns of 
institutional viability, in the form of public perception, and to concerns 
about respecting the separation of powers.259  But, as Justice Douglas once 
famously noted, when considering the separation of powers, the Court 
should be mindful of Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that “it is a 
constitution we are expounding.”260  Consequently, “[i]t is far more 
important [for the Court] to be respectful to the Constitution than to a 
coordinate branch of government.”261  And while brave jurists have made 
such assertions throughout the Court’s history, the Court is not without 
some pessimism about its ability to effectively protect civil liberties in 
wartimes or national emergencies.  For example, in Korematsu—one of the 
worst examples of judicial deference in times of crisis—Justice Jackson 
dissented, but he did so “with explicit resignation about judicial 
powerlessness,” and concern that it was widely believed that “civilian 
courts, up to and including his own Supreme Court, perhaps should abstain 
from attempting to hold military commanders to constitutional limits in 
wartime.”262  Significantly, even when faced with the belief that the effort 
may be futile, Justice Jackson dissented.  As I describe in the following 
section, that dissent serves a valuable purpose.  But, for the moment, I must 
consider the external influences on the court that resulted in that feeling of 
judicial futility. 
In the Kiyemba case, the influences of both politics and public 
perception dominated.  For example, the government’s relocation efforts 
could be construed as an effort to remove the case from the Court’s grasp—
resolving the Uighurs’ plight, without necessitating judicial review.263  
Through its “delay-then-moot strategy,” the Executive controlled the 
Court’s ability to determine a significant constitutional issue—the 
appropriate remedy for a habeas violation—by eliminating the Court’s 
power to review the case.264  The motivation for this strategy remains 
 
 259.  See Patrick R. Hugg, Federalism’s Full Circle, 35 LOY. L. REV. 13, 61 n.284 (1989) (“One 
justification for abstention is that it will limit perceptions [of intrusion and] protect the Court from 
hostile public reaction.”).  
 260.  Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 894 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 261.  See id. at 894 n.3 (citing G. HAUSNER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE COURTS OF ISRAEL 228 
(1958)). 
 262.  John Q. Barrett, A Commander’s Power, a Civilian’s Reason: Justice Jackson’s Korematsu 
Dissent, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57–58 (2005).  See generally Robert Jackson, Wartime Security 
& Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (1951) (discussing the balance of liberty and security in 
times of national crisis).  
 263.  Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter, supra note 4, at 3-4 (describing what Willett refers to as the 
Executive’s “repeated efforts to avoid review in detention cases,” noting that the “delay-then-moot 
strategy” has not been confined to the Uighurs, and citing Rasul v. Bush and Padilla v. Hanft as 
examples of similar cases).  
 264.  See id.at 4 (stating that the government’s relocation “efforts have been timed for the eleventh 
hour, in order to avoid [the Supreme] Court’s review of an important principle governing all of the 
[Gitmo] detention cases”). 
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uncertain.  It is tied perhaps, at least in the Obama administration, to the 
congressional grilling received by former Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates on the possibility of transferring the Uighurs into the interior of the 
United States.265  In the face of widespread objection and fear mongering, 
the Obama administration ultimately bowed to congressional pressure, and 
terminated efforts to relocate the Uighurs within the continental United 
States.266  More significantly, the Executive made these efforts the basis for 
its request that the Supreme Court deny continued review in Kiyemba. 
IV. WHAT IS AT STAKE? 
The Kiyemba litigation arose in a fascinating context: the War on 
Terror, with all of its Executive excess, fear-mongering, and deprivation of 
individual rights.  But it must be remembered that, at moments in the War 
on Terror and before, the courts of this country have risen above politics, 
and above fear, to resolutely declare the ongoing vitality of the rule of law.  
The Supreme Court itself has done so, most recently in Boumediene v. 
Bush.  In the years since that decision, holes in the Court’s doctrine have 
become apparent; and it is time for the Supreme Court to speak again, and 
to clearly articulate the remedy that accompanies the habeas corpus right.  
As I describe below, the rule of law remains viable only so long as there 
are those who are willing to defend it, to honor it, and to enforce it.  A 
public reminder that such commitment exists could do much to invigorate 
in the public, and one hopes, in the government, a renewed obligation to 
the rule of law. 
A. The Irrelevance of Boumediene? 
Why is the Supreme Court’s refusal to consider Kiyemba of such 
significance?  It has, as counsel for the Uighurs noted, left the D.C. 
Circuit’s Kiyemba I ruling “cemented in place,” and rendered Boumediene 
v. Bush “of little practical relevance.”267  Indeed, “[w]ithout further 
enforcement by [the Supreme] Court of Boumediene’s unmistakable 
mandate, the D.C. Circuit’s contrary approach will lead to further 
protracted delay in the resolution of Guantanamo detainees’ rights and 
continued failure by the courts to follow Boumediene’s teaching with 
regard to extraterritorial application of the Constitution.”268  This is 
 
 265.  See Julian E. Barnes, Gates Backs Plan to Let Detainees In, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at 13.  
Gates is not the only official to have been grilled on the possibility of releasing the Uighurs into the 
United States.  See, e.g., Sara Sorcher, Counterterrorism Nominee Grilled on Guantanamo, NAT’L J. 
DAILY, July 27, 2011. 
 266.  Kauffman, supra note 159 (noting the congressional objection to release into the United 
States).  
 267.  Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter, supra note 4, at 1.  
 268.  Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of the Petition for 
Certiorari at 23, , Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (Dec. 11, 2009) (No. 08-1234). 
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precisely what has happened—if not worse.  Review in the D.C. federal 
courts, the sole adjudicators of the rights of the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees,269 is halted by the uncertainty of the remedy to be provided to a 
successful habeas petitioner.270  Indeed, some Guantanamo detainees “are 
denied hearings altogether, as courts conclude that they have no judicial 
remedy power beyond Executive discretion.”271  Thus, Guantanamo 
detainees can expect no relief whatsoever other than what the Executive 
provides. 
So, we return to where we started: with an unchecked Executive and a 
judicial branch that knowingly refuses to intervene.  Perhaps the Court’s 
unwillingness to entertain Kiyemba on the merits signals its desire to no 
longer be involved in the political debate surrounding the detainees.272  
Indeed, Boumediene was, arguably, decided only after it became clear that 
the Court could no longer avoid the constitutional issue—pressed 
previously in Hamdan and Rasul.  Thus, with the entry of a new, 
theoretically enlightened administration, perhaps the Court was prepared to 
bow out gracefully, hoping that the need to bring the judiciary into the 
wartime power debate, and consequently jeopardizing its institutional 
reputation,273 would be reduced.  But, the decision to bow out gracefully 
had the very opposite effect—undermining the Court’s credibility and 
costing the Court its moral high ground. Recognizing the role that practical 
and political factors can potentially influence courts, arguably such external 
factors may have guided the Court in its review of the Kiyemba cases.  In 
any event, the Court refused to “go to bat” when the going got tough. 
If courts do not carry out their role as protectors of individual liberty 
interests, then it remains for others—including dissenting jurists—to sound 
the alarm.  In the years leading up to and immediately following 
Boumediene, hope for the continued viability of the rule of law remained 
strong, as did hope that national security fundamentalism would not be a 
mainstay.  However, by denying review in Kiyemba, the Supreme Court 
has allowed another court to gain the upper hand, dictating outcomes in the 
Guantanamo habeas cases.274  As Linda Greenhouse recently noted, since 
 
 269.  Christine Waring, Note, The Removal of International Law from Guantanamo Detainee 
Litigation: Problems and Implications of Al-Bihani v. Obama, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 927, 956 (2012). 
 270.  Feb. 19, 2010 Willett Letter, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that a post-Kiyemba habeas court 
“can only ask the Executive jailer to take ‘necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps’” as a remedy for 
unlawful detention, and noting that this so-called “remedy” allows “the Executive to nullify a judicial 
[remedy] ruling” entirely).  
 271.  Id. at 4 (citing sealed orders filed separately under seal).  
 272.  Cf., e.g., Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting an instance in 
which the court was “spared from having to wade into the debate over whether” due process applies to 
noncitizen detainees).  
 273.  After all, these were a series of 5-4 decisions, with a great deal of vitriol from the losing 
sides.  
 274.  See Linda Greenhouse, Goodbye to Gitmo, Opinionator Blog, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2012), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/goodbye-to-gitmo/. 
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Boumediene, “the justices have basically permitted the Guantanamo issue 
to be outsourced—not, of course, to another country, but to another court, a 
few blocks down Constitution Avenue: the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit.”275  There, review “has been anything 
but meaningful.”276  Indeed, the D.C. Circuit “has been something very 
close to a rubber stamp” for the Executive’s war on terrorism decisions.277  
Surely, this abdication is troubling, particularly in light of the “institutional 
pride”278 displayed by the Court in the years immediately following 9/11.  
Greenhouse demands that “the Supreme Court take the rein back into its 
own hands, and as Chief Justice John Marshall famously promised, tell us 
what the law is.”279  And if not all of the Court—all nine justices, with their 
widely ranging views—at the very least, there should have been a justice 
willing to vocalize the error of this way.  There should have been a dissent. 
B. The Need for Dissent 
A dissent from the denial of certiorari in either Kiyemba I or Kiyemba 
III would have given voice to the observations and concerns about the 
meaning of freedom, the appropriate application of the separation of 
powers doctrine, and the continuing viability of the rule of law described 
above.  There is ample authority to support such a dissent, and examples 
throughout the Court’s history, even its recent history, that support a 
justice’s decision to author a dissent to a denial of certiorari or a dismissal.  
Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Mezei provides a model for giving 
voice to similar concerns.  There, he noted, “it is startling, in this country, 
to find a person held indefinitely in executive custody without accusation 
of crime or judicial trial.”280  Indeed, Justice Jackson noted, such 
imprisonment “has been considered oppressive and lawless since [King] 
John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned, 
disposed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the 
law of the land,” and the “judges of England developed the writ of habeas 
corpus largely to preserve these immunities from executive restraint.”281  
Strongly demanding judicial enforcement of due process, Justice Jackson 
stated, “[i]t still is inconceivable to me that this measure of simple justice 
and fair dealing would menace the security of this country.”282  He 
concluded with a simple, yet enduringly powerful statement: “No one can 
 
 275.  Id.  
 276.  Id.  
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id.  
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting).  
 281.  Id. at 218–19. 
 282.  See id. at 227–28.   
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make me believe that we are that far gone.”283  With these words, Justice 
Jackson gave voice to the rule of law.  And while these words come in a 
dissent, they resonate today, more than fifty years later, as clearly as any 
portion of the majority’s opinion.  Indeed, what was true for Justice 
Jackson is true today: We cannot be made to believe that we are so far gone 
that individuals, subjected to indefinite and unlawful detention, must 
continue to suffer in confinement and may not enjoy the remedy associated 
with the relief that they so sought. 
Early in the series of cases involving the indefinite detention of 
individuals unilaterally labeled “enemy combatants,” the Supreme Court, in 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla,284 dismissed a detainee’s petition on technical 
grounds, avoiding the merits raised therein.  Justice Stevens authored a 
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, in 
which he took exception to the Court’s minimization of the issues at stake 
in the case.285  Justice Stevens explained: 
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society.  
Even more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and 
their successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the 
Executive by the rule of law. . . . For if this Nation is to remain true to the 
ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to 
resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.286 
Three years later, the Court denied the initial petition for certiorari 
review in Boumediene v. Bush for technical reasons related to the 
exhaustion of available remedies.287  Justice Breyer, joined by Justice 
Souter and Justice Ginsburg, filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari, stating that they would have granted the petitions for certiorari 
and ordered expedited argument.288  For Justice Breyer, the issue 
presented–whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006 deprived the 
courts of jurisdiction to consider the detainees’ habeas claims was 
unconstitutional–deserved “the Court’s immediate attention.”289  He 
explained: “‘In view of the public importance of the questions raised by 
[the Uighurs’] petitions and of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of 
war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional 
safeguards of civil liberty, . . . we [must] consider and decide [such] 
questions without any avoidable delay.’”290  As Justice Breyer explained, 
“the ‘province’ of the Great Writ, ‘shaped to guarantee the most 
fundamental of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy instrument 
 
 283.  Id. at 228.   
 284.  542 U.S. 426 (2004).  
 285.  See id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 286.  Id. at 465.  
 287.  549 U.S. 1328 (2007).  
 288.  See id. at 1329 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 289.  Id. at 1329–30. 
 290.  Id. at 1333 (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)).  
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by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention of a 
person.’”291  Significantly, he noted: 
[P]etitioners have been held for more than five years.  They have not 
obtained judicial review of their habeas claims.  If petitioners are right 
about the law, immediate review may avoid an additional year or more of 
imprisonment.  If they are wrong, our review is nevertheless appropriate 
to help establish the boundaries of the constitutional provision of the writ 
of habeas corpus.  [Moreover,] whether petitioners are right or wrong, our 
prompt review will diminish the legal uncertainty that now surrounds the 
application to Guantanamo detainees of this fundamental constitutional 
principle.292 
Likewise, I assert that the Court should have considered Kiyemba on 
the merits.  So doing would have avoided the uncertainty surrounding 
application of Boumediene to habeas remedies.  It also may have avoided 
additional months or years of detention for the Uighurs, and would have 
allowed the Court to shape the outer contours of the writ of habeas corpus 
by defining the writ’s remedial aspect.  But, given the Court’s apparent 
unwillingness to do so, the very least that was necessary was a dissenting 
opinion—a statement acknowledging the import of these issues and giving 
voice to concerns about the meaning of freedom, separation of powers, and 
the rule of law, particularly as we pass the ten year mark since 9/11. 
Without Supreme Court intervention, Guantanamo Bay remains a 
legal black hole.  Although detainees’ detentions may be judicially deemed 
unlawful, the possibility of release from the base without the Executive’s 
consent seems almost hopeless. As Muneer Ahmad wrote in a recent 
article, Guantanamo has become a place where the remaining detainees 
have “no right to have rights,” or at least, if they have rights, they have no 
right to a remedy for their violation.293  Likewise, Lyle Denniston has 
recently noted that the Supreme Court, by denying certiorari review in 
seven separate detainee appeals, has “confirmed emphatically . . . that it is 
not now inclined to further second-guess the government’s detention 
policy.”294  Not one of these denials was accompanied by a dissent.  Thus, 
the fate of the Guantanamo detainees, including the remaining Uighurs, 
rests, as I described above, largely in the hands of the political branches 
and the D.C. Circuit. 
Linda Greenhouse recently argued that “[t]he fate of the detainees, 
 
 291.  Id. at 1330 (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)). 
 292.  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 293.  Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 N.W. 
L. REV. 1683, 1687 (2009). Ahmad goes on to argue that, by consistently referring the detainees as 
terrorists, and by consistently denying them access to our legal system, the detainees have been largely 
dehumanized. 
 294.  Lyle Denniston, Court Bypaasses All New Detainee Cases (Final Update), SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 11, 2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/court-bypasses-all-new-detainee-
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now numbering 169 and in some instances entering a second decade of 
confinement, was, after all, never the [Supreme Court’s] principal 
interest.”295 Instead, the Court was motivated “primarily [by] a separation-
of-powers concern”; that concern “fueled the inter-branch drama of 2004 to 
2008, during which a shrinking minority, over increasingly sharp dissents, 
pushed back against the Bush administration and Congress to assert the 
court’s own institutional authority.”296  The Court’s concern, I believe, 
must be both: It must assert the continued viability of the rule of law on 
behalf of those whose rights have been violated, and on behalf of the 
judiciary, whose ongoing role is essential to maintaining our constitutional 
structure.  At the very least, a dissent could make this point. 
CONCLUSION 
As Justice Jackson famously noted, I find it hard to believe that a 
person—regardless of citizenship—can be incarcerated in a territory of this 
country indefinitely, without charge or without trial; I find it equally hard 
to believe that a person can be found unlawfully detained, but remain so.  
Yet, this apparently is the way that it is in the aftermath of 9/11, 
particularly because the Court has ended its dialogue on the subject of 
justice for Guantanamo detainees.  The fact that no member of the Court 
spoke out in dissent in Kiyemba is unfortunate; the misapplication of 
immigration law, resulting in the ongoing detention of some Uighurs is 
simply inhumane.  Upon a finding that their detention was unlawful, 
immediate release was the only appropriate remedy and, indeed, is the 
remedy demanded by centuries of English and American law, as well as 
basic humanitarian and human rights concerns.  Put simply, the two 
Uighurs remaining at Guantanamo Bay are entering the second decade of 
their detention, despite having been cleared entirely of terrorist affiliation.  
This is not the rule of law, nor is it a fact that we should ignore.  The writ 
of habeas corpus provides a mechanism for resolving this situation.  It must 
be applied. 
While Boumediene v. Bush was heralded as the end of the Bush 
administration’s failed detention policies,297 it has not been so for the 
Uighurs, and the other detainees, remaining at Guantanamo Bay.  With the 
Obama administration adopting many of the Bush administration’s policies, 
and with the D.C. Circuit rubber stamping those actions, Supreme Court 
action is needed.  Whether the Uighurs will ever know freedom and 
American justice is yet to be determined.  So far it has not happened.  But 
the promise of Boumediene—the promise of our Constitution—demands it.  
 
 295.  Greenhouse, Goodbye to Gitmo, supra note 274. 
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And the ultimate responsibility for expounding that Constitution lies with 
our highest court.298 
To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, we have a republic, but only if we 
can keep it.299 Review of Kiyemba by the Supreme Court, or in the very 
least, a meaningful dissent by a single justice from the denials and 
dismissals of review, might have given voice to the importance of the rule 
of law in a democratic society, and might have gone a long way toward 
keeping the republic we have been given well within our grasp. 
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